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SOME QUESTIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY-REVIVALISTS
LINDA C. MCCLAIN* AND JAMES E. FLEMING**

[Civil society is] a concept rich in historical resonances; a concept
where a good part of the appeal is the sense of many levels and
layers of meaning, deposited by successive generations of thinkers.
With it, as most of its uses clearly testify, we are in the realm of the
normative, if not indeed the nostalgic. "Civil society" sounds good;
it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a fine old wine, full of
depth and complexity. Who could possibly object to it, who not
wish for its fulfillment? Fine old wines can stimulate but they can
also make you drunk, lose all sense of discrimination and clarity of
purpose. What is the case for reviving the concept of civil society?'
I. THE CALLS FOR REVIVING OR RENEWING CIVIL SOCIETY

In this article, we raise some questions for proponents of reviving
civil society as a cure for many of our nation's political, civic, and
moral ills (whom we designate as "civil society-revivalists").2 Calls to
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics, Harvard
University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. We are grateful to
William Galston for helpful correspondence concerning the arguments in this article. We also
have learned from discussing the arguments with Sot Barber, Mike Dorf, Martin Flaherty, Bob
Gordon, Abner Greene, Steve Macedo, Michael McConnell, Frank Michelman, and Ben
Zipursky. We would like to thank Jessica Givelber, Melissa Lawton, and Connie Lenz for
valuable research assistance. Finally, we are grateful to Steve Heyman for inviting us to
organize a symposium on civil society. We presented drafts of the article at the 1999
Communitarian Summit and the Georgetown University Law Center Discussion Group on
Constitutional Law, as well as at faculty workshops at Boston University School of Law,
Fordham University School of Law, and Hofstra University School of Law, and we benefited
from comments at those sessions. Harvard, Hofstra, and Fordham provided generous financial
support.
1. Krishan Kumar, Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an HistoricalTerm, 44

BRIT. J. Soc. 375, 376 (1993).
2. We appreciate that "civil society-revivalist" is a broad, omnibus category that is both
over and underinclusive. But it does seem to us, based on studying the literature about civil
society, that a number of scholars, public commentators, and political figures have called for
reviving or renewing civil society. It is possible to find some common themes among those who
have done so and we needed a general term to capture these currents of thought. We certainly
do not intend to suggest that all proponents of reviving or renewing civil society think the same
things, or that they are a monolithic group. Finally, we do not mean the term "civil societyrevivalist" to be a derogatory term. We find support for our usage of the term "revival" in the
title of a book that includes essays by a number of persons whose ideas we analyze in this
article. See COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIvAL OF CIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA (E.J. Dionne,
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revive or renew civil society are increasingly prominent in political
and legal discourse, and such revival has been the subject of intense
study and major organizational effort.3 The erosion or disappearance
of civil society is a common diagnosis of what underlies all manner of
discontent, disorder, and divisiveness in America, and its renewal
features prominently as a cure for such problems. First Lady Hillary
Clinton, inspired by Vaclav Havel, calls for building up civil society
(i.e., a realm between the individual and the state that includes "our

churches, our families, our civic associations") in order to inculcate
values in "our children," rather than leaving such education to the
mass media and "the consumer culture. '' 4 She also characterizes civil

society as "one of the most important zones of existence" and as a
"pillar" between the other "two pillars of modem life," the

marketplace and the government.'

President Bill Clinton and other

political figures invoke a strengthened civil society to address
problems that government alone cannot solve.6 In the widelydiscussed article, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam finds evidence of

the disappearance of civil society and loss of social capital in such
phenomena as the decline of bowling leagues (a disappearance that
he subsequently has attributed to television).7 And a central premise
Jr., ed., 1998). We find support for our usage of "renewal" in the title of a commission, the
National Commission on Civic Renewal, whose report we discuss, see infra note 10, and in the
title of a book edited by the research director of that commission. See CrVIL SOCIETY,
DEMOCRACY, AND Civic RENEWAL (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999). We have spoken of
calls for the "revival" of civil society in preference to "the revivification of civil society," a
formulation used by Jean Bethke Elshtain, who is Chair of the Council on Civil Society, see
infra note 11, because the former is simpler and is more commonly used in the discourse on civil
society. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 16 (1995).
3. See Elizabeth Norell, Civil Society, Studied, FOuND. NEWS & COMMENTARY, Sept.Oct. 1997, at 15 (detailing the proliferation of groups studying civil society).
4. John M. Broder, For Hillary Clinton at 50, Yet Another Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1997, § 1, at 20.
5. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Civil Society: The Space That Matters Most, NEW PERSP. Q.,
Spring 1998, at 12, 12.
6. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Calls for Volunteers in Communities and Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, § 1, at 8.
7. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65 [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone]; Robert D. Putnam, The
Strange Disappearanceof Civic America, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1996, at 34. Putnam has also
published a well-received scholarly book, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1993). The claims that civil society is in decline and that social capital has
eroded raise difficult empirical questions, including how to sort out causation and correlation, as
well as evaluative questions, such as what "counts" as civil society and what measures indicate
and explain its decline. We do not seek to venture into, or contribute anything new to, the everincreasing scholarly literature concerning the empirical questions, spawned largely by Putnam's
essay, Bowling Alone, concerning the decline of civil society. See, e.g., William A. Galston &
Peter Levine, America's Civic Condition: A Glance at the Evidence, in COMMUNITY WORKS,
supra note 2, at 30 (reviewing the available data); Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence
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of a recent book, Seedbeds of Virtue, is that America's most serious
long-term problem is the weakening of child-raising families-said to
be first and most basic among the seedbeds of virtue, or institutions of
civil society-and that, accordingly, the challenge of shoring up those
seedbeds should be at the "front and center of American public

deliberation. "8
Broadly speaking, there are two strands of civil societyrevivalists, which a leader in the civil society movement recently
characterized as the civic revivalists and the moral revivalists. 9 These
two strands are illustrated by two recent reports. The first, written by
the National Commission on Civic Renewal, is entitled A Nation of
Spectators: How Civic DisengagementWeakens America and What We
Can Do About It.10 The second, issued by the Council on Civil
Society, is entitled A Call to Civil Society: Why Democracy Needs
Moral Truths." The two reports are thoughtful, programmatic, and
constructive documents, and they embody in disciplined form many
of the themes that have pervaded the more rhetorical, polemical
literature about reviving or renewing civil society that preceded them.
of Social Justice and Civil Society, 12 SOC. F. 149 (1997) (questioning Putnam's explanation of
the decline of civil society and evaluating many causes of such decline). Based on our
assessment of that literature, it seems reasonably clear that it is unhelpful to speak about civil
society, as a monolithic entity, in decline. There do appear to be generational shifts in both the
nature and quantity of participation in civic life and various forms of association, but there are
also important differences between women and men and among racial and ethnic groups in
these respects. Moreover, civil society today may encompass forms of community and
connection unavailable in earlier generations (e.g., "virtual communities" in cyberspace,
electronic town meetings, and the like). Elsewhere, one of us has touched upon these matters.
See Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 759 (1999).
8. Mary Ann Glendon, Introduction: Forgotten Questions, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE:
SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CMZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1, 2 (Mary
Ann Glendon & David Blankenhom eds., 1995).
9. See Don Eberly, Civic Renewal or Moral Renewal, J. AM. CITIZENSHIP POL'Y REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 44.
10. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CiviC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CIVIC
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1998) [hereinafter
A NATION OF SPECTATORS]. William J. Bennett and Senator Sam Nunn are Co-Chairs of the
Commission. Professor William A. Galston, who is Executive Director of the Commission, has
contributed a response to this symposium, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, 75
C01.-KENT L. REV. 603 (2000). Copies of this report are available through the National
Commission on Civic Renewal, 3111 Van Munching Hall, University of Maryland, College Park,
Md. 20742; (301) 405-2790 (phone); (301) 314-9346 (fax); <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/
civicrenewal>.
11. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS (1998) [hereinafter A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY]. Professor Jean Bethke
Elshtain, Chair of the Council, has contributed a response to this symposium, Will the Real Civil
Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583 (2000). Copies of this report
are available through the Institute for American Values, 1841 Broadway, Suite 211, New York,
N.Y. 10023; (212) 246-3942 (phone); (212) 541-6665 (fax); iav@worldnet.att.net (email).
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There is overlap between these reports' goals, 12 diagnoses, and
prescriptions-just as there is some overlap in their signatories 3 - but
the former emphasizes "civic renewal" and reinvigorating civic
character, the capacity for citizenship, and engagement in shared civic
purposes, 14 while the latter stresses "moral renewal," nurturing "the
seedbeds of virtue," and "rediscovering" the "moral truths" of "the
15
public moral philosophy that makes our democracy possible.'
The two reports, taken as illustrating civic and moral revivalists,
share several premises. First, civil society-understood broadly as
"families, neighborhood life, and the web of religious, economic,
educational, and civic associations" 6-plays a vital role in fostering
and nurturing the capacity for democratic citizenship. 7 Second,
despite great prosperity and freedom, America faces serious
problems of civic and moral decline (a diagnosis they support with
appeals to public opinion polls), and family "breakdown" is a key
indicator of crisis. 8 Third, a renewed and strengthened civil society is
an important-if not the most important-means to civic and moral
renewal. Accordingly, individuals, communities, and various levels of
12. A Nation of Spectators proclaims that "[tihe goals of civic renewal are straightforward:
to strengthen the institutions that help form the knowledge, skills, and virtues citizens need for
active engagement in civic life; to remove the impediments to civic engagement wherever they
exist; and to multiply the arenas for meaningful and effective civic action." A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 12. A Call to Civil Society identifies three major goals: (1) "to
increase the likelihood that more children will grow up with their two married parents"; (2) "to
adopt a new 'civil society model' for evaluating public policies and solving social problems"; and
(3) "to revitalize a shared civic story informed by moral truth." A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY,
supra note 11, at 18.
13. There are three persons who signed both reports: Jean Bethke Elshtain, William A.
Galston, and Mary Ann Glendon.
14. See A NATION OF SPETATORS, supra note 10, at 5-12.
15. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 3, 6, 7-13, 13-16. Professor Elshtain
objects to our drawing a distinction between civic renewal and moral renewal, and she asks:
"Why not simply speak of civic renewal?" Elshtain, supra note 11, at 587. We do not
understand why she objects to also speaking of moral renewal. Indeed, A Call to Civil Society
speaks repeatedly of "moral renewal." See, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at
15, 16, 18, 21. It also contends that civic renewal is not enough and that moral renewal is
necessary. See id. at 14-15. Furthermore, we do not understand the basis for Professor
Elshtain's statement that "It is hard to understand how this concern [for how good citizens come
into being] implicates A Call to Civil Society in shirking civic matters, as McClain and Fleming
suggest." Elshtain, supra note 11, at 589.
16. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 6.
17. See id.; A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 8.
18. Manifestations of such decline include growing distrust of government, decreasing civic
and political engagement, breakdown of families and neighborhoods, increasingly coarse and
uncivil popular culture and politics, and growing economic inequality. See A CALL TO CIVIL
SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 5-6; A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 5-6. For the
reports' appeals to public opinion polls, see, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at
4-5; A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at inside cover, 5.
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government should commit themselves to the renewal of civil
society. 19 Finally, each report expresses the conviction that, because
America is a religious nation, "faith-based institutions" should play
an important role in such renewal and thus in civic and moral
renewal. 20
Notwithstanding these shared premises, there is an important
distinction between the two reports, and between civic and moral
revivalists, concerning the relationship among religion, a shared
morality, and civic and moral renewal. A Nation of Spectators states
that "civic renewal unquestionably rests on a moral foundation," but
identifies it as "the constitutional faith we share-in the moral
principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence, and the
public purposes set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution. '' 21 In
contrast, A Call to Civil Society contends that moral truths underwrite
civic truths as well as the rationale for democratic civic engagement. 22
Thus, a vital "seedbed of virtue" is a "public moral philosophy"
consisting of "a larger set of shared ideas about human virtue and the
common good." 2 Indeed, the report contends that "our democracy
depends upon moral truths," and further states that "the moral truths
that make possible our experiment in self-governance" and
"authorize the possibility of our democracy" are "in large part biblical
and religious." 24 Thus, according to the latter report, civic renewal is
not enough; moral renewal, resting upon "independent moral truths,"
including a particular conception of the human person and the
essential conditions for human flourishing, is what is called for.25 This
19. A Nation of Spectators finds encouraging evidence of stirrings of a "new movement of
citizens acting together to solve community problems" and argues that it should be
strengthened. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 9. A Call to Civil Society advances
"the civil society proposition," that civil society is "the best-not perfect, but best-conceptual
framework for understanding and responding to the most urgent challenge facing our society:
the moral renewal of our democratic project." A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 6.
20. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 12 ("[Blecause we remain a strongly
religious nation, faithful citizens and faith-based institutions are pivotal to any American
movement for civic renewal."); see also A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 21 ("The
sina qua non for American renewal is the renewal of a common moral life," and "[sluch a
renewal will not take place unless faith communities and religious institutions play a leading
role, since vigorous communities of faith are vital to the discernment and transmission of moral
truth.").
21. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 12.
22. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 13.
23. Id. at 14.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 14-16. Don Eberly, a signatory to A Call to Civil Society and Director of the Civil
Society Project, describes (and advocates) this as the "civil society plus" approach: that the
current movement to revive civil society "be grounded in a deeper foundation of objective
moral principles," because "America, since its inception, has operated on both a civic creed and
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difference between civic truths or constitutional faith and moral
truths or public moral philosophy sets the two reports apart and
makes A Nation of Spectators more appropriate, and A Call to Civil

Society more problematic, in our morally pluralistic constitutional
democracy.
Civil society-revivalists carry forward themes sounded nearly a

decade ago in prominent critiques of rights and "rights talk" in
maintaining that there is an imbalance between rights and
responsibilities, and that the responsible exercise of rights that makes

"ordered liberty" possible requires that persons possess certain
virtues and traits of character. 26 (And some of the earlier critics of

rights talk are prominent voices in the calls to revive civil society.)
For example, Mary Ann Glendon has analyzed the erosion of civil
society and the seedbeds of virtue as a consequence of a paradox

inherent in liberal democracy, and some revivalists have contended
that an excess of liberal virtues, such as tolerance taken too far, are

"lethal" to those seedbeds. 27 On this view, the American experiment

of liberal democracy presupposes certain traits of character that make

"ordered liberty" possible-here the frequently-invoked text is The
Federalist No. 5528-but liberalism cannot create or sustain those

virtues. This American experiment "leaves it primarily up to families,
local governments, schools, religious and workplace associations, and
a host of other voluntary groups to teach and transmit republican
virtues and skills from one generation to the next.

'29

Because the

a transcendent creed, and both are required to sustain a healthy republic." DON E. EBERLY,
AMERICA'S PROMISE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERICAN CULTURE 5 (1998);
see also Christopher Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Summer
1996, at 47, 56-57 ("There is more to our cultural and moral devastation than even a vibrant civil
society can solve"; "the renewal of American society requires that we attend not only to our
institutions" but also to reinvigorating a "democratic moral consensus.").
26. See, e.g., AMITAi ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY (1993); WILLIAM A. GALSTON,
LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); MARY
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); The
Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Winter 1991-1992, at 4. Elsewhere, one of us has criticized these critiques of rights and "rights
talk." See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994). For
Professor Elshtain's contribution to such critiques, see, e.g., ELSHTAIN, supra note 2.
27. Glendon, supra note 8, at 12.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("As
there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and
distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher
degree than any other form."). Both reports refer to Madison's formulation regarding the
virtues needed for self-government. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7; A
NATION OF SPECTATORS, supranote 10, at 4, 12.
29. Glendon, supra note 8, at 2.
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founders took the seedbeds of virtue, including the institutions of civil
society, for granted as a virtually inexhaustible resource, indeed, a
natural resource, there was no apparent need for a Constitution that
exacted virtue (e.g., through a Bill of Duties or Responsibilities). 3°
Nor did the founders establish a regime of government that provided
for a national project of character formation. The paradox is that
liberal democracy depends upon civil society for orderly social
reproduction, or the creation of good citizens, but it contains the
seeds of its own destruction.
The argument seems to be that the "absolutist" nature of
American "rights talk," the inattention in law and politics to
intermediate associations between the individual and the state, and
the ascent of a liberal ethic of "expressive individualism" (in contrast
with an ethic of self-sacrifice, responsibility, and mutual obligation)
have eroded the seedbeds of virtue, undermined civil society, and
imperiled our liberal democracy. 31 Both reports sound these claims
and themes. 32 Some revivalists further claim that commitment to
liberal virtues such as toleration "slides all too easily into the sort of
mandatory value neutrality that rules all talk of character and virtue
out of bounds"33 and thus bars government from shaping character
and favoring those seedbeds that foster it.
In this article, we pose some questions for civil society-revivalists
and raise doubts about some of their claims. What lies behind many
of the calls to revive civil society is a concern to generate trust and
social solidarity in a diverse polity. This concern sometimes goes
hand in hand with a somewhat nostalgic longing for the vibrant civil
society that Alexis de Tocqueville observed in America in the 1830s
and described as central to making our democracy work.34 But the
30. See GLENDON, supra note 26, at 116-20.
31. See generally SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8; GLENDON, supra note 26.
32. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 6, 16, 18; A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 6-8.
33. Glendon, supra note 8, at 12. But see GALSTON, supra note 26, at 222 (rejecting the
interpretation of toleration as implying relativism or neutrality).
34. For example, Putnam writes: "When Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s,
it was the Americans' propensity for civic association that most impressed him as the key to
their unprecedented ability to make democracy work." Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 7,
at 65. He continues, quoting a passage from Tocqueville that is often invoked by civil societyrevivalists: "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever
forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all
take part, but others of a thousand different types-religious, moral, serious, futile, very general
and very limited, immensely large and very minute .... Id. at 65-66 (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-14 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans.,
1969) (1835)). Within the literature about reviving civil society, some have cautioned about
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cure is not a communitarian revival of the civil society of
Tocqueville's day, which excluded entire categories of persons from
membership in civil society and from equal citizenship in the polity.
The better approach is to develop a synthesis of liberalism, feminism,
and civic republicanism that has a place for civil society -recognizing
that it can be a good thing while realizing that it is not a panacea-but
that focuses on our deeper commitments to equal citizenship and to
securing the preconditions for democratic and personal selfgovernment (what we have elsewhere called deliberative democracy
and deliberative autonomy),35 which will require placing certain limits
on civil society. Ultimately, we plan to offer such a normative
conception of civil society as a realm of the constitution of selves and
citizens under our Constitution and in our constitutional democracy.
Here, we shall raise some questions, issue some cautions, and express
some doubts about whether the revival of civil society can reasonably
be expected to accomplish what its proponents hope for it.
At the outset, we wish to make clear that we are not "anti-civil
society." In fact, we largely believe that it would be a good thing to
revive or renew civil society. Nonetheless, we believe (as we say
below) that much of the value of doing so relates as much to securing
what we call "deliberative autonomy" -enabling people to decide
how to live their own lives-as to promoting "deliberative
democracy" -preparing them for participation in democratic life. To
deny the importance of civil society, including families and voluntary
associations, as a generative source of human goods would run
contrary to many people's experiences of their own lives, and it would
conflict with our own normative conception of the proper roles of
civil society in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy. Nor
do we deny that there is an important reciprocal relationship between
civil society and democracy, although we believe that the relationship
is far more complex and indeterminate than many civil societyrevivalists evidently maintain or assume. The civil society-revivalists
usefully put on the table a serious issue, how a liberal democratic
society produces citizens capable of engaging in responsible selfavoiding the "nostalgia trap." See generally COMMUNITY WORKS, supra note 2. Moreover, one
of the reports specifically denies that it "want[s] to 'roll back the clock,'" [r]eturn to the 1950s,"
"[r]everse the gains made by women and minorities," or "'go back' to some earlier era." A
CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 5.

35. See James E. Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211
(1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructing];James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing];see also James E. Fleming & Linda
C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L. REV. 509 (1997).
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government and thus reproduces itself.
Although we are skeptical and critical concerning many of the
claims of the civil society-revivalists, our aims here are not merely
cautionary and critical. We also begin to sketch our own views
concerning the proper roles and regulation of civil society in our
pluralistic polity. Many of our points apply to both the civic renewal
strand and the moral renewal strand of civil society-revivalism, and
some apply more to one than the other. For what it is worth, we are
quite sympathetic with the goals of the civic revivalists, and thus with
A Nation of Spectators, despite our serious reservations about that
report's discussion of families and religion or "faith-based
institutions" and our skepticism about the extent to which revival of
civil society will bring about civic renewal and strengthen bonds of
citizenship. We have similar reservations about the discussion of
these matters in A Call to Civil Society, as well as fundamental and
pervasive criticisms of many of the moral revivalists' goals, diagnoses,
and prescriptions.
II. SOME QUESTIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY-REVIVALISTS

A. How Does Civil Society Serve as Seedbeds of Virtue and Foster
Self-Government?
1. The Claim That Civil Society Is a School for Citizenship
Many civil society-revivalists contend that the institutions of civil
society are "seedbeds of virtue" - our foundational sources of
that they foster selfcompetence, character, and citizenship" 36-and
37
(We use the general term "self-government" rather
government.
than "democratic self-government," for there is an ambiguity in the
civil society literature between self-government as "government of
the self" and self-government as government of and by a people 3 and,
in any event, it is unclear exactly how the virtues supposedly
generated in civil society contribute to democratic self-government, as
36. A CALLTO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7.
37. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7-13; A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 8, 12-19; SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8.
3& See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7 ("[S]elf-government begins with
governing the self."); A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 8 ("We believe that the
essence of democracy is self-government, that self-government begins with the government of
the self and moves to the public efforts of citizens whose need for the restraint of law is
mitigated by their capacity to restrain themselves.").
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discussed below.) But what is their conception of virtue and how
does civil society serve these purposes? The moral revivalists seem
practically to conflate civic virtue with traditional morality and
personal virtues (or "standards of personal conduct") such as
"honesty, trust, loyalty, cooperation, self-restraint, civility,
compassion, personal responsibility, and respect for others," 39 to say

nothing of "respect for moral law, and neighbor-love, or concern for
others." 4 It is no accident that the word "civic" does not appear in
the title of the book Seedbeds of Virtue.41 Such revivalists give
considerably less attention to civic virtue in the sense of the
disposition to care about the common good of the whole polity and
the capacity to deliberate about it than to virtue in the sense of
traditional morality and personal virtues. (They may assume the
unity of the virtues without justifying this view.) And although some
moral revivalists invoke such liberal virtues as toleration of and
respect for diversity, many evince considerable ambivalence toward
those virtues and even suggest that an excess of them has been
"lethal" for the seedbeds of virtue in civil society. 42 By contrast, civic
revivalists typically have a stronger conception of civic virtue and
43
greater respect for diversity.
How does civil society foster self-government? Civil societyrevivalists commonly claim that civil society creates good citizens who
possess the virtues and traits of character necessary for selfgovernment: It prepares children to be good citizens, and it equips
citizens, through participation in associations, with the arts and habits
of self-government. We take up these two claims in turn.
First, many civil society-revivalists claim that one of the primary
functions of civil society is preparing children to be good citizens, and
that the family is "the first and most basic" seedbed of virtue, "cradle
of citizenship," or school for citizenship. 44 Let us grant that families
(putting to one side until later the contested questions of family form
and injustice within the family) play a vital role in social reproduction
39. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
41. A Call to Civil Society elaborates upon twelve "seedbeds of virtue," id. at 7-13, but it
also refers to them at one point as "seedbeds of civic virtue." Id. at 7.
42. See GLENDON, supra note 26; SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8.
43. See, e.g., A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 8, 12; GALSTON, supra note 26
(developing a substantive conception of liberal democratic virtues for a diverse society).
44. See, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 6-7; A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 8-13; David Blankenhorn, Conclusion: The Possibility of Civil Society, in
SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 271,275.

2000]

SOME QUESTIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY- REVIVALISTS

and should play an important role in democratic education. But the
case still has to be made concerning whether and how they do so.
Glendon, for example, extols "household table talk" as an exemplary
discourse countering America's individualist public rhetoric and
containing seeds for the renewal of civil society. But how does "table
talk," with its "recollection and retelling of the family's concrete
experiences, and ... the household's fund of stories about
relationships, obligations, and the long-term consequences of present
acts and decisions, ' 45 shape family members for democratic selfgovernment? It may well build family solidarity, and strengthen the
family as a community of "memory and mutual aid," but does it foster
a broader sense of social solidarity and citizenship? Glendon also
notes the special role of women as transmitters of family lore and
values, but she gives only passing attention to the gender inequality in
traditional households and to how such households will be schools for
citizenship rather than teachers of inequality. More generally, there
is nothing about families and their moral discourses that insures that
they will be seedbeds of virtue rather than seedbeds of vices such as
parochialism, prejudice, and intolerance (as discussed below in
connection with incivility and the problem of "bad seeds"). 6 Nor is
there any guarantee that they will inculcate civic virtues needed for
democratic self-government rather than simply teaching personal
virtues helpful for governing the self. In short, families may well help
children develop into good people without helping them to become
good citizens.
Second, many civil society-revivalists claim that participation in
voluntary associations within civil society fosters the arts and habits of
self-government. 47
Let us concede that participation in such
associations can be and generally is a good thing. Nonetheless, as
Yael Tamir observes, "[t]here is no reason to believe that, left on
their own, associations will serve as a seedbed of democracy." 48 For
example, it is hardly self-evident how participation in bowling leagues
nourishes the habits and skills of citizenship, much less civic virtue

45. GLENDON, supra note 26, at 174.
46. For a variation on this theme, see Beem, supra note 25, at 50 ("What of the family, the
,seedbed of civic virtue?' Surely many families positively exemplify the most deleterious
tendencies of our materialistic, individualistic culture.").
47. See, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 6-9, 14; A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, supranote 10, at 8-11, 40-42.
48. Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 219-20
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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and democratic self-government. 9 As communitarian thinker Amitai
Etzioni suggests, such associations may foster some sort of social
bonds, or even strong, though extremely narrow, shared culture. But
how, he asks, do people in bowling leagues, chess clubs, and choirs
develop a commitment to shared values? 50 John Rawls usefully
suggests that virtues that are characteristic of certain forms of
51
association in civil society are distinguishable from political virtues.
And as with families, nothing about associations as such assures that
they will be generators of civic virtues rather than vices. Many
associations, such as white supremacist groups, gangs, and organized
crime families, offer opportunities for solidarity and shared values,
but these are inimical to civic virtues and democratic self-government.
Moral revivalists acknowledge this problem of distinguishing
between "good" civil society and "bad" civil society ("such as private
militias or efforts to exclude racial minorities")52 and attempt to
address it by recourse to a shared public moral philosophy as a
guiding force in associational life. They reject civic participation as an
"independent imperative," because it is "more about process than
substance," and it is "ultimately a means, not an end in itself. 5 3 For,
they argue: "Effective civic engagement requires a public moral
philosophy. Absent a guiding set of shared moral truths, voluntary
civic associations can be just as harmful to human flourishing as any
big government bureaucracy or big business bureau." 54 Their
approach triggers a number of questions. What generates the public
moral philosophy? Do the associations in question have the capacity
to determine the content of that philosophy or is it handed down, for
example, through the efforts of religious leaders to discern and
transmit moral truth? If this is the ideal of how civil society should
function, how would moral revivalists move actual civil society,
49. Katha Pollitt incisively asks, "[F]or whom the ball rolls" in those bowling leagues, or
"Why should you care about the leagues?" Katha Pollitt, For Whom the Ball Rolls, NATION,
Apr. 15, 1996, at 9, 9 (discussing Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 7). She continues:
"Because, says Putnam, they bowl for thee: A weak civil society means less 'trust' in each other,
and that means a less vigorous democracy, as evidenced in declining voter turnouts." Id. For a
cautionary, comical tale of virtue and vice in bowling leagues, see the Coen brothers' 1998 film
The Big Lebowski.
50. See AMrrAi ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE 96 (1996).
51. JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 194-95 (1993).
52. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 14.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Beem, supra note 25, at 50 (arguing that "in many instances, the active,
dynamic expression of civil society in contemporary America not only does not alleviate our
society's moral failings, it manifests and reinforces them").
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replete with attitudes and beliefs that do not conform to the public
moral philosophy, toward this ideal? To put the question in Etzioni's
terms, are the moral revivalists not seeking the "good society" rather
55
than civil society as such?
Civic revivalists appeal to "shared civic principles" and also
believe that certain attitudes (e.g., self-sacrifice, responsibility, and
sense of obligation to the common good) make democracy possible,
while their degeneration imperils it. But how does participation in
civil society inculcate such principles or foster such attitudes? One
strategy is to restructure the institutions of civil society better to
generate and transmit such values. For example, A Nation of
Spectators affirms the important role of schools in fostering "the
knowledge, skills, and virtues our young people need to become good
democratic citizens," and offers the specific prescription that schools
"reorganize their internal life to reinforce basic civic virtues. 5 6 It also
endorses civic education as a part of the school curriculum." (We
share such a commitment to civic education.)58
But what of voluntary associations, particularly those in which
adults participate? Do such associations generate democratic values?
A Nation of Spectators acknowledges that some democratic values are
"not the goals of associational life, but byproducts. '59 Furthermore,
the report asks: "[W]hy should there be such an obvious linkage
between free associations and political democracy?" and concedes the
possibility that "[t]he goods various groups seek to produce might, in
principle, be hostile to the flourishing of other groups and
contemptuous of democratic values." 6 Yet, its conclusion is simply to
note inconclusiveness on this difficult issue: "Commentators on civil
society find themselves in sharp conflict over 'congruence' - the idea
that the internal structures and norms of voluntary associations
should (or must) be democratic, participatory, and civil if they are to
promote broader societal aims of political democracy."'61 We take up
the issue of "congruence" in the next section.
55. Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the PrescriptiveState, 75 CHI.KENT L. REV. 355 (2000).
56. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 14.

57. See id.
58. We largely agree with the arguments regarding civic education in Stephen Macedo's
new book. See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).

59. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 40.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id.
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2. The Personal and Political Uses of Pluralism
Nancy Rosenblum's extensive study of the morality of
association and of membership in groups, Membership and Morals:
The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America,6 2 is quite helpful in
assessing the relationship between civil society and liberal democracy.
Rosenblum deploys the terms "liberal anxiety" and "liberal
expectancy" to capture the conflicting set of attitudes that political
and legal theorists sometimes adopt concerning this relationship. On
the one hand, some accounts of liberal democracy view it as capable
of sustaining itself even without civic virtue. For example, one might
think of models of interest group pluralism or of the founders' notion
that separation of powers and limitations upon government, rather
than virtue, would curb excesses of self-interest. On the other hand,
there is "liberal expectancy" of "congruence" between civil society
and democracy-that is, that the values cultivated in civil society will
be liberal democratic values and thus will undergird liberal
democracy, as "seedbeds of civic virtue" - along with "liberal
anxiety" that such congruence may not exist or develop over time.63
As a number of civil society-revivalists argue, the founders seemed to
assume that such a relationship would exist and that a national
governmental project of inculcating civic virtue would be
unnecessary. But what if, as Rosenblum argues, the virtues of
associations are not necessarily congruent with democratic values?
Should government seek to achieve such congruence through
democratic education and other forms of persuasion to cultivate only
those associations which instill and sustain democratic values, and to
weed out those associations which do not? Answering this question
involves addressing the fundamental question of whether the values
of associational life must be congruent with those of political life in
order to sustain a healthy polity, a question to which we return below
(in discussing the problem of "bad seeds").
An alternative conception of civil society does not insist upon
congruence, but stresses the mediating functions of civil society
between individuals and the state, or the "dense networks" of
62. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998). Strictly speaking, Rosenblum is not a civil society-revivalist,
though she was on one of the advisory panels to the National Commission on Civic Renewal, see
A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 66, and she contributed an essay to a book
produced for the Commission. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, The Moral Uses of Pluralism,in CIVIL
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 255.

63. See ROSENBLUM, supranote 62, at 10-15, 36-41.
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associational life. Here, the point is that associations may not
generate explicitly democratic values, but instead may cultivate a
"whole range of moral dispositions, presumptively supportive of
political order," such as cooperation or social trust.64 To use a current
term, associations generate "social capital. '65 This, Rosenblum
observes, is a "more capacious approach to the moral uses of
association than the logic of congruence," because "[t]he business of
instilling habits of responsibility, reciprocity, cooperation, or trust is
compatible with a variety of political orientations and substantive
values." 66 This approach is more pluralistic and tolerant, the
argument goes, because associations need not be obviously liberal to
generate such values; after all, those values themselves are not
exclusively liberal. Yet this mediating approach must grapple with
hard questions about the proper scope of freedom of association for
illiberal groups that may foster anti-democratic values and indeed
may advocate or lead to internal secession of groups and individuals
from the polity.
Both the congruence approach and the mediating approach to
civil society, Rosenblum argues, rest upon an "airy 'liberal
expectancy."' 67 Both lack an adequate foundation of psychological
realism concerning the moralizing or socializing power of groups
upon those who join them and the contribution, if any, of such group
membership to liberal democracy. 68 These accounts also fail, in her
view, to capture an important aspect of civil society, "the personal
uses of pluralism." 69 The reason that the existence of a dense array of
associations matters, she contends, is that associations facilitate the
experience of pluralism in people's lives: "[w]e must be able to
exploit, willfully and inadvertently, the moral possibilities of
membership in diverse associations. ' 70 Rather than emphasizing the
role of civil society in sustaining democratic self-government, she
stresses its role in facilitating personal self-government. She argues
that government should secure the conditions for freedom of
association, including protecting rights to exit as well as to enter
64. Id. at 41.
65. See, e.g., Robert K. Fullinwider, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND
CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 1, 2 (discussing the term "social capital" with reference to the
work of Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama).
66. ROSENBLUM, supra note 62, at 42.
67. Id. at 45.
6& See id. at 47-50.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 46.
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associations. 71 She has characterized her work as a "corrective" to

'72
"the logic of congruence.
We find persuasive Rosenblum's appeal to psychological realism
and her conclusion that the relationship between group membership
and liberal democratic values, beyond the cultivation of a disposition
to cooperate, is indirect and indeterminate. 73 And we think that her
account lends support to an important point that is often overlooked
or insufficiently appreciated in the work of the civil society-revivalists:
We should avoid a "flight from the political," that is, the temptation
to think that civil society practically can exist independently of the
state, or that it can be virtually self-sustaining without the state. 74

Furthermore, to the extent that revivalists contemplate that civil
society can substitute for or supplant the state, we believe that
skepticism is in order (as we discuss below).

We also embrace Rosenblum's conclusion that associational life
may have vital importance for personal development or selfgovernment (or, as we put it, deliberative autonomy). Her analysis
confirms our own intuitions that civil society is at least as important
for securing deliberative autonomy-enabling people to decide how

to live their own lives-as for promoting deliberative democracypreparing them for participation in political life. Rosenblum also
finds that the disposition to cooperate, formed in associations, can
further the important good of self-respect. 75

This self-respect, she

suggests, can be a form of "compensation" for disappointed social,
political, or economic expectations. 76 Such disappointments, she
argues, are inevitable in a pluralistic democracy in which economic

71. See id. at 350.
72. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Remarks at the Panel on Nancy L. Rosenblum's Membership
and Morals, the Communitarian Summit (Feb. 27, 1999).
73. In her conclusion, Rosenblum uses the phrase "the requisites of democracy in everyday
life" to capture her view as to "what we do owe one another in everyday life," the virtues of
"treating people identically and with easy spontaneity" and "speaking out against ordinary
injustice." ROSENBLUM, supra note 62, at 350. She concludes that associations contribute in
varying degrees to fostering such democratic virtues. Id.
74. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Society: CulturalPossibility of a Modem Ideal, SOCIETY, Mar.
-Apr. 1998, at 16, 16. Among the proponents of reviving civil society, the civic revivalists
generally are probably less likely than the moral revivalists to be tempted to think that civil
society practically can exist independently of the state. Indeed, A Nation of Spectators does not
express such a view. See infra text accompanying notes 223-24. Nor does Galston. Galston,
supra note 10, at 2. We do, however, believe that some moral revivalists, especially conservative
ones, sometimes talk as if they believe this (just as some conservative economists and law and
economics scholars talk as if they believe markets are self-sustaining in the absence of the state).
75. ROSENBLUM, supra note 62, at 62-63.
76. See id.
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and other forms of inequality exist. 7 Finally, Rosenblum concludes
that some associations, although they may not cultivate virtue, serve
an important function of containing vice: Groups "provide relatively
benign outlets for ineradicable viciousness, intolerance, or narrow
self-interests," and help in containing anti-democratic dispositions,
78
even if they cannot be corrected.
We generally endorse Rosenblum's argument concerning the
importance of civil society for personal self-government, and we
largely agree with her position regarding congruence. 79 We interpret

her not as rejecting the idea that associations can contribute to
democratic self-government and to civic virtue, but rather as calling
for greater precision about claims concerning such contribution. 0 To
that end, we believe that a more complete account would include two

correctives concerning the links between civil society and democratic
77. See id. Undeniably, given the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion, associations
themselves "mirror, reinforce, and actively create social inequalities," while they offer antidotes
to the "vicious effects of pluralism." Id. at 63. Similarly, associations can be a source of
reparation of injury. See id. at 64, 69-70.
7& Id. at 48. This claim may seem counterintuitive, or counterfactual, but Rosenblum
claims, in her study of secessionist or white supremacist groups, that membership in such
groups, however disconcerting it may be in a liberal democracy, can provide an outlet or safety
valve for anti-democratic attitudes, and it can sometimes avoid dangerous spillover into
violence. See id. at 9.
79. We do not, however, endorse Rosenblum's thoroughgoing criticism of the Supreme
Court's treatment of freedom of association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984). Id. at 158-76. Professor Galston notes of us that "[w]hile [they] endorse Rosenblum's
overall position, they reject her critique of the Roberts decision." Galston, supra note 10, at 605.
He contends: "They cannot have it both ways. Rosenblum's general stance leads directly to her
specific conclusions about the inappropriateness of government intervention to enforce gender
equality throughout civil society. To reject her conclusion is necessarily to reject the premises
on which it rests." Id. With all due respect, we submit that one can believe that Roberts was
rightly decided as a matter of constitutional law on the ground that prohibiting gender
discrimination in places of "public accommodation" like the Jaycees is a compelling
governmental interest without thinking that it is appropriate for the government to intervene to
enforce gender equality "throughout civil society"; the former view does not necessarily "lead
directly to" the latter view. For one thing, most institutions within civil society are not "public
accommodations" as a matter of constitutional law and therefore they are beyond the reach of
the Roberts decision. For another, it is appropriate and justifiable in some circumstances for the
government to regulate freedom of association in order to attempt to secure equal citizenship
for all, including women and racial minorities. Rosenblum herself has acknowledged that the
workplace is an important exception to the autonomy of group life and fully endorsed, e.g., Title
VII. Rosenblum, supra note 72. And so, to reject Rosenblum's conclusion regarding Roberts is
not necessarily to reject her overall position regarding "the logic of congruence." See infra note
138 (discussing some of the ways in which it is justifiable for government to take measures to
attempt to secure equal citizenship for women, short of insisting upon "congruence" between all
institutions of civil society and democratic values).
80. Thus, in her contribution to this symposium, Rosenblum explores the potential of
political parties, at the invitation of her colleagues to "identify the associations that stand out as
qualitatively most valuable for democratic public life and political virtue."
Nancy L.
Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares:Political Partiesand Civil Society, 75 CH.-KENT. L. REv. 493,
493 (2000).
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self-government. First, it should reckon with the vital function
performed by civil society in affording a space for, as Jane
Mansbridge puts81 it, "deliberative enclaves of resistance" or
"counterpublics." Second, it should recognize that civil society can
offer a multiplicity of spaces in which deliberative democracy, or
public deliberation, can take place. In this sense, we believe that civil
society indeed does offer the opportunity for "personal uses of
pluralism," but that it also has political "uses" that pertain to
democratic life.
Our first corrective to Rosenblum's account draws upon
Mansbridge's contention that democracies, in practice, can produce at
best a "rough" or "good enough" legitimacy, and that they need
"ways short of civil disobedience and the breakdown of normatively
based mutual cooperation to recognize and fight the ongoing injustice
of their procedures and their outcomes."82 Moreover, she argues,
"even the most just societies need.., enclaves of protected discourse
and action," because "no democracy ever reaches the point at which
justice is simply done."83 As she characterizes such enclaves or
"counterpublics":
The goals of these counterpublics include understanding
themselves better, forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the

memories of past injustices, interpreting and reinterpreting the
meanings of those injustices, working out alternative conceptions of
self, of community, of justice, and of universality, trying to make
sense of both the privileges they wield and the oppressions they
face, understanding the strategic configurations for and against
their desired ends, deciding what alliances to make both
emotionally and strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and
deciding how to act, individually and collectively. 84
The various phases of the women's movement offer one example
of such a counterpublic. The many forms of "identity politics,"
however problematic, provide another. Such grass roots movements
as the National Welfare Rights Organization are yet another. Some
scholars describe an "oppositional civic culture" characteristic of
African-Americans' civic life, in which institutions of civil society
have both nurtured "norms that legitimized the civic order" and
"served as sources of opposition to white supremacist practices and
81. Jane
DIFFERENCE:
1996).
82. Id. at
83. Id. at
84. Id.

Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 46, 55 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
46, 47, 55.
58.
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discourse."8 5 All of these groups may seek change through political
and legal channels, but they may also engage in battles to transform
cultural understandings. (Think of efforts of gay men and lesbians in
these respects.) This dimension of.civil society fortifies the argument
for governmental fostering of civil society. And it is consistent with
an evidently paradoxical feature of pluralist constitutional democracy:
Government fosters associations, even though they may be

''oppositional" to the state and they certainly offer multiple sites of
power distinct from the state. 86 What is more, this dimension of. civil
society focuses upon individual and group agency, for example, the
efforts of social movements, to transform both civil society and the
polity better to realize certain ideals of equal citizenship, justice, and

community. 87
Our second corrective, that an adequate account of civil society
should recognize that it can provide a multiplicity of sites outside
formal political channels in which public deliberation can take place,
derives from Seyla Benhabib's work on deliberative democracy and

85. Frederick C. Harris, Will the Circle Be Unbroken?: The Erosion and Transformation of
African-American Civic Life, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIvic RENEWAL, supra
note 2, at 317, 323.
86. Mark Tushnet has suggested that "[a] paradox lies at the heart of this interest in
revitalizing the institutions of civil society as a check on government: Those institutions are
themselves constituted by government, not in the sense that they are called into being by
government, but in the sense that their boundaries are defined by the government." Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 379 (2000). Abner
Greene, however, has challenged Tushnet's claim of a paradox. Abner S. Greene, Civil Society
and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477, 477 (2000). For valuable
analysis of multiple sites of norms and power distinct from the state, see id.; Abner S. Greene,
Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996). For an
interpretation of Justice Brennan's judicial opinions and other writings as reflecting a "romantic
liberalism," which includes an attraction to "the idea of the endless contestability of just about
every social-normative constraint," a solicitude for agitators and disturbers, and a tolerance for
disrupting order, see FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 72-83 (1999).
87. One of the reports notes that "a key function of civil society is to defend freedom
against external threats-including the power of the state." A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra
note 10, at 41. The report continues: "But these civil conversations can also merge into ongoing
political debates about social justice and the common good. Social movements frequently arise
within civil society, giving voice to new publics and promoting new causes and political
identities." Id. The report here acknowledges Jean Cohen's observation that the "purportedly
'uncivic' generation" that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s
created the first consumers' movement since the 1930s, the first environmental
movement since the turn of the century, public health movements, grassroots activism
and community organizing, the most important feminist movement since the preWorld War I period, the civil rights movement, and innumerable transnational
nongovernmental organizations and civic movements-all of which have led to
unprecedented advances in rights and social justice.
Id. at 43 n.12 (quoting Jean L. Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 55, 69).
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the problem of democratic legitimacy88 Her account of deliberative
democracy operates within a model of discourse ethics, and our own
approach derives from Rawls's framework of political liberalism, but
we find a number of her basic assumptions cogent and instructive
(and largely compatible with political liberalism), 9 Contending that
"[t]he fiction of a general deliberative assembly in which the united
people expressed their will belongs to the early history of democratic

theory," she finds that "today our guiding model has to be that of a
medium of loosely associated, multiple foci of opinion formation and
dissemination which affect one another in free and spontaneous

processes of communication." 90 A plurality of forms of association
can contribute to such deliberation, ranging from "political parties, to
citizens' initiatives, to social movements, to voluntary associations, to
consciousness-raising groups, and the like." 91 As Benhabib puts it:
It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of
associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous
"public conversation" results. It is central to the model of
deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of
mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of
deliberation, contestation, and argumentation. 92

Such norms as "universal moral respect and egalitarian
reciprocity" should guide these processes. 93 This, on Benhabib's view,
is how deliberative democracy attempts to satisfy the problem of
88. Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 81, at 67. For another useful account of the "civil
public sphere," inspired by discourse ethics, see Cohen, supra note 87, at 70-71 (charging that
American "civil society talk" leaves out the public sphere, which is "[flrom the point of view of
democratic theory... the only possible setting in which all concerned can participate in the
discussion of contested norms and policies").
89. Benhabib assumes that value pluralism, i.e., disagreement about the highest goods of
human existence and the proper conduct of a morally righteous life, is a fundamental and
persisting feature of modem life. Benhabib, supra note 88, at 73. (Rawls speaks of this feature
in terms of the "fact of reasonable pluralism." RAWLS, supra note 51, at 36.) She maintains that
deliberative democracies must find procedures, and employ some form of practical rationality,
by which to reach binding agreement about certain issues of the common good. See Benhabib,
supra note 88, at 72-73. (Rawls would speak in terms of public reason. RAWLS, supra note 51,
at 212-54; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).)
90. Benhabib, supra note 88, at 74. She concludes that "the chief institutional correlate of
such a model of deliberative democracy is a multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of
many publics and public conversations" and that, "[i]n other domains of social life as well," this
model "can inspire the proliferation of many institutional designs." Id. at 87.
91. Id. at 73. Rosenblum takes up the issue of political parties in her contribution to this
symposium. See Rosenblum, supra note 80.
92. Benhabib, supra note 88, at 73-74. See Rawls, supra note 89, at 775 n.28 (stating that
what Benhabib calls the "public sphere," Political Liberalism calls the "background culture of
civil society").
93. Benhabib, supra note 88, at 79.
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democratic legitimacy. Although such deliberation, contestation, and
argumentation certainly will take place in political bodies such as
legislatures, she cautions against an overly sharp distinction between
public and private institutions. 94 For instance, she draws upon Nancy
Fraser's distinction between "opinion-making" and "policy-making"
public bodies, observing that "opinion-making" bodies such as social
movements "can lead us to reconsider and rethink very controversial
issues about privacy, sexuality, and intimacy" and that general
legislation by "policy-making" bodies may not be the only or even the
most desirable consequence of such processes of public deliberation. 9
Both Mansbridge and Benhabib stress an important dimension of
civil society: the public sphere need not be homogeneous and
suppress difference; instead, "heterogeneity, otherness, and
difference can find expression in the multiple associations, networks,
and citizens' forums" that make up public life. 96 Moreover, within the
deliberative process itself, norms of universal moral respect and
egalitarian reciprocity would "allow minorities and dissenters both
the right to withhold their assent and the right to challenge the rules
as well as the agenda of the public debate." 97
To recapitulate our critique of the claim that civil society serves
as "seedbeds of virtue" or directly undergirds liberal democracy: (1) it
is not obvious that civil society, and the groups or associations within
it, contribute directly to democratic values; some associations may do
so, but the relationship between civil society and democracy, beyond
the cultivation of the disposition to cooperate, is indirect and
indeterminate; (2) there are reasons to protect civil society other than
its supposed contribution to democratic values or support of the state;
conversely, there are reasons to resist efforts by the state to achieve
congruence between civil society and the state; (3) civil society
contributes to liberal democracy by affording oppositional space to
"enclaves of protected discourse and action," which allow social
actors to seek to correct the injustices of an ongoing democracy by
94. Benhabib points out that the institutions of civil society are often subject to public
regulation and scrutiny, that institutions, individuals, and movements in civil society attempt to
influence the public-political process, and that civil society and its associations "are not public in
the sense of always allowing universal access to all, but they are public in the sense of being part
of that anonymous public conversation in a democracy." Id. at 76.
95. Id. at 84 (citing Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution.to the.
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 123 (Craig
Calhoun ed., 1992)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 79.
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bringing about social change; and (4) civil society provides a
multiplicity of sites in which public deliberation can take place.
B. Have Liberal Conceptions of the Person CorrodedCivil Society
and Undermined Self-Government?
Understanding the revivalists' diagnosis of the breakdown in the
capacities necessary for the "government of the self,"98 and their
conception of how civil society nurtures those capacities, requires an
examination of their underlying conception of the person. Indeed, A
Call to Civil Society suggests that "defining the human person may be
where America's civil society debate is ultimately headed." 99 Moral
revivalists, more clearly than civic revivalists, reject as "fundamentally
flawed" a model of the person that they attribute, in part, to the
liberalism of John Rawls. A Call to Civil Society describes this flawed
model as follows: "We are self-originating sources of valid claims,
essentially unencumbered self-owning and auto-teleological. For
short, call it a philosophy of expressive individualism, or a belief in
the sovereignty of the self-a kind of modern democratic equivalent
of the old idea of the divine right of kings." 1°°
Having set up this caricature of a liberal conception of the person
as an "unencumbered" self, A Call to Civil Society offers an
alternative conception: human beings are "intrinsically social beings,
not autonomous creatures who are the source of their own meaning
'
and perfection."101
Persons are "free, reasonable, and therefore
responsible beings with a basic drive to question in order to know,"
further, "our capacity for reasonable choosing and loving is what
allows us to participate in a shared moral life, an order common to us
all." 102
We will sketch several points in response. First, the report's
contrasting accounts of the person set up false dichotomies between
autonomous beings and social beings, as well as between autonomy
and responsibility. As we have explained elsewhere, in elaborating
forms of Rawlsian political liberalism, a commitment to a principle of
autonomy does not entail a commitment to atomism, or to the idea
98.
note 10,
99.
100.
(1980)).
101.
102.

See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7; A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra
at 8.
A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 16.
Id. (citing John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism [sic] Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 543
A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 16.
Id. (citing Rawls, supranote 100, at 543).
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that persons can or do exist independently of 'a web of social relations
or social influences. 13 Rawls himself speaks of the various institutions
of civil society as part of the "background culture" and contends that
they play a vital role in nurturing and forming citizens.1 4 And
political liberalism further conceives of persons as social and situated
selves, rather than "unencumbered" selves. For it envisions citizens
as "normal and fully cooperating members of society" who "want to
be, and to be recognized as, such members," that is, as members who
are capable of respecting and exercising, not merely the rights, but
also the duties, of citizenship °5
Second, the report's analysis sloppily reduces a Rawlsian form of
liberalism to an "expressive individualism," and perhaps even to an
"anything goes" moral relativism.' ° But to recognize, as Rawls does,
that "reasonable moral pluralism" concerning comprehensive moral
views is a fact of life in a modern constitutional democracy adhering
to a principle of toleration' °7 does not equate with such views.
Granted, Rawls does not argue for a particular comprehensive moral
view as a shared basis for public justification, or as a shared public
moral philosophy. But he does posit that persons with differing
comprehensive views can reach an overlapping consensus concerning
a political conception of justice and, so doing, endorse fair terms of
social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect. 0 8
Third, Rawls' political liberalism does not rest upon the
conception of the person that A Call to Civil Society attributes to it.
Rawls puts forward a political conception of the person as having two
moral powers, a capacity for a conception of justice and a capacity for
a conception of the good, 10 9 which correspond roughly with the
capacity for democratic self-government (or deliberative democracy)
and the capacity for personal self-government (or deliberative
autonomy). Both of us have advanced forms of political liberalism
that justify securing the preconditions for the development and
103. See Fleming, Securing, supra note 35, at 37, 43-46; Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man"
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1204-06
(1992).
104. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 14.
105. Id. at 18, 84.
106. A Nation of Spectators also criticizes an understanding of individual liberty that stresses
self-expression, self-realization, and personal choice, A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10,
at 6-7, but it does not specifically link such an understanding to a conception of the person
attributed to Rawls.
107. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 36-37, 144.
10& See id. at 133-72.
109. See id. at 19, 81,302, 332.
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exercise of these two moral powers. u0 In that respect, political
liberalism does not rule out, but rather supports, a project of fostering
the capacities of citizens for democratic and personal selfgovernment. To that extent, it does not deny that government has a
basic responsibility to help foster the "conditions for human
flourishing.""' But the preconditions for democratic and personal
self-government that political liberalism would secure are more
appropriate to a constitutional democracy characterized by
reasonable moral pluralism than are the conditions for human
flourishing that the moral revivalists would foster.
A Call to Civil Society states that "pluralism is a fact and freedom
is a birthright,"12 but it intimates that moral disagreement may be
largely avoided or overcome through recourse to reason and moral
truths. 13 Of course, it does acknowledge the likelihood of continuing
moral disagreement, but mainly on the ground that "our access to
truth is imperfect," not because reasonable moral disagreement is
inevitable or desirable in a pluralistic society.1 4 This moral revivalist
view appears to differ notably from leading accounts of deliberative
democracy, which attribute such disagreement not only to
"incomplete understanding" (similar to imperfect access to truth), but
also to, among other things, "incompatible values" and "scarcity of
resources.""15 It also seems to differ from Michael Sandel's civic
republican conception of a process more "clamorous" than
"consensual," one that suggests ways of conducting political
16
argument, not transcending it.1

A Call to Civil Society makes recurring recommendations that
religious institutions should play a "leading role" in moral renewal
because "vigorous communities of faith are vital to the discernment
110. See Fleming, Constructing,supra note 35, at 287-89; Fleming, Securing,supra note 35, at
18-20; Fleming & McClain, supra note 35, at 511-12, 548-50; Linda C. McClain, Toleration,
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to
Toleration As Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 23-24, 40-42, 106-15 (1998).
111. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 16; see McClain, supra note 110, at 40-42,
106-31 (advancing a feminist form of political liberalism that entails affirmative governmental
responsibility to promote capacity for living good, self-governing lives).
112. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 12.
113. Id. at 27.
114. Id. at 27 (including, among the "summary propositions": "because our access to truth is
imperfect, most moral disagreement calls for civility, openness to other views, and reasonable
argument in the service of truth").
115. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 26 (1996)
(another factor they discuss is limited human generosity).
116. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 320 (1996).
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and transmission of moral truth. '117 In this respect, the report seems
premised, not upon a deliberative democracy model-in which
citizens vigorously and respectfully engage with one another to
deliberate over public matters and to attempt to find common
ground-but instead upon a theological model-in which
transcendent truth comes to individuals through revelation,
meditation, or mediation through wise, discerning, and uplifting
religious leadersllB
To be sure, some civil society-revivalists
(including some moral revivalists) urge that debate over public moral
principles need not (and even should not) attempt to ground a
consensus on truths gleaned from "revealed religion."119 A model of

deliberative democracy that would allow room for appeals to
religious beliefs, as well as to other comprehensive moral views, so
long as citizens attempt also to appeal to public values and to offer

some sort of reasonable justification for their arguments, seems more
acceptable for a polity characterized by reasonable moral pluralism.120
Finally, it is striking that, although many civil society-revivalists
offer civil society as an antidote to individual autonomy and excessive
individualism, some scholars have suggested that the defining feature

of civil society in America is precisely its focus on the autonomous
individual, or "agentic" person, rather than on the community.121 If
117. A CALL TO CIL SOCIETY, supranote 11, at 21.
118. Beyond specific references in A Call to Civil Society to the role of religious leaders in
discerning and transmitting moral truths, there is the cover of the report and the interpretation
of it. The cover is a Thomas Cole portrait, The Voyage of Life: Youth. The report explains the
choice of painting in terms that confirm this revelatory, rather than deliberative, approach to
truth:
Cole here presents America as a land of Edenic beauty and limitless vitality, often
animated by the impetuosity of youth. We also see the tension between the young
Voyager's longing for worldly success, as represented by the imaginary palace in the
sky, and his ultimate dependence upon transcendent truth, as represented by the
guardianAngel of which, as young man, the Voyager is still unaware.
Id. at back inside cover (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., EBERLY, supra note 25, at 205-10 (urging that "the debate over the
relationship of religion to politics and the state should not set back the search for a moral
framework that joins secular and religious adherents" and exploring a number of foundations
for moral life and for restoring society beyond "revealed religion"); Beem, supra note 25, at 47,
57 (arguing that "in an atmosphere of religious pluralism... a moral consensus that rests on
explicit theological claims appears simply impossible" and unnecessary; "moral beliefs about
human rights and equality can be grounded in the universal features of human existence").
120. For a discussion of the role of religious beliefs, see, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
supra note 115, at 55-69; Rawls, supra note 89, at 776, 783-84.
121. See ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CnvL SOCIETY 109-10 (1992). But see
EBERLY, supra note 25, at 201-02 (acknowledging that "the United States has always placed a
premium on the individual, perhaps more so than any civilization," but arguing for a "moral"
conception of individualism, "ultimately grounded in religion" rather than "utilitarian
individualism").
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so, and the commitment to the primacy of the individual moral agent
has deep roots in American soil, then the revivalists need to reckon
with this feature of our "ecology" more than they have. Moreover, as
feminist critiques of communitarian quests for communities of place,
or involuntary bonds, suggest, such quests lack an adequate critique
122
of the problem of domination within such communities.
In this regard, it is instructive to consider the evolution in the
thinking of Sandel. In his first book, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice, he criticized liberalism for its conception of persons as
"unencumbered selves."123 Yet in his recent book, Democracy's
Discontent, he speaks not of "encumbered selves" in thickly
constitutive associations and communities but of "multiply-situated
selves" claimed by "multiple loyalties.1 24 He suggests: "The civic
virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way
among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations
that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties
give rise." 125 Here Sandel's civic republicanism comes to resemble
both liberal notions of the revisability of the self and feminist
1 26
concerns for the ability to exit oppressive communities.
C. Does the Revivalist Focus on the Family Focus on the Right
Problems?
Because the family features as first and foremost among the
seedbeds of virtue in much of the revivalists' discourse about civil
society, the endangered state or crisis of America's families prompts
great concern. 127 The signs of this crisis include high divorce rates and
the high incidence of single-parent (usually fatherless) families. A
subsidiary claim is that the other institutions of civil society on which
the family depends are also failing or weakening and that we face a
fraying "moral fabric" and a weakened "social ecology.' 1 28 Moral and
civic revivalists share this concern over family "breakdown" and the
prescription of shoring up the two-parent, marital family as a core
goal in moral and civic renewal. Indeed, A Call to Civil Society
122. See infra text accompanying notes 196-97.
123. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 175,182 (1982).
124. SANDEL, supra note 116, at 350.

125. Id.
126. See Fleming & McClain, supra note 35, at 532.
127. See generally DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR
MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8.

128. GLENDON, supra note 26, at 110-20; Glendon, supra note 8, at 9.
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diagnoses "the steady break-up of the married couple child-raising
unit as the leading propeller of our overall social deterioration and
'
the necessary starting point for any strategy aimed at recovery.'

29

Revivalists' rhetoric about the need for a particular family form to
pursue moral and civic renewal continues the discourse of the 1990s
over family forms, played out in debates over the appropriate societal

response to families headed by single mothers ("fatherless" families),
welfare reform, and same-sex parenting. 3°
We already have summarized the basic revivalist arguments
about the importance of families in rearing good citizens. We accept

the premise that families, as a part of the basic structure of society,
play a central role in social reproduction: that is, in attending to "the
raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral development
and education into the wider culture," so that, as citizens, they "have

a sense of justice and the political virtues that support political and
social institutions.' 1 31 Our questions about the focus on the family

include whether the revivalists take seriously enough the import of
the so-called "war over the family" (that is, the debate over family
forms), the implications of feminist critiques of the traditional family
and of traditional marriage, and the calls by feminists and others to
instantiate care as a public value.
Feminist analysis of the family offers a more cautious assessment
of its potential as a seedbed of civic virtue, for that work suggests
that, often, the family thwarts women's own self-constitution and fails
to foster their free and equal participation in political and civic life.
To put the point dramatically, some feminist work suggests that the
institution of the family is instead too often a "hellhole" of oppression
for women and children.132 How can the family serve as a school for

citizenship when it is a realm of unequal power in which men exercise
129. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 18; see A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra
note 10, at 13 ("As a nation, we must commit ourselves to the proposition that every child
should be raised in an intact two-parent family whenever possible, and by one caring and
competent adult at the least."); see also SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 3 ("The
simultaneous weakening of child-raising families and their surroundings and supporting
institutions constitutes our culture's most serious long-term problem.").
130. In fact, key voices in those earlier debates are also prominent voices in the ongoing civil
society discourse. For example, William Bennett is a Co-Chair of the Commission issuing A
Nation of Spectators. William Galston is the Executive Director of A Nation of Spectators and a
signatory to A Call to Civil Society. David Blankenhorn, author of the book FatherlessAmerica,
is a signatory to A Call to Civil Society and an editor of Seedbeds of Virtue. Mary Ann Glendon
is a signatory to both reports and is the other editor of Seedbeds of Virtue.
131. Rawls, supra note 89, at 788.
132- See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1311 (1991).
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dominance over women and children and the latter are subject to
violence and abuse?133 Moreover, Susan Moller Okin's critique of
leading accounts of liberalism poses the question: How can the family
serve as a school for moral education when it is unjust, that is, when
there is a sexist and unjust division of labor between men and women
with respect to the burdens of child-rearing and household work?13 4
Too often, a characteristic feature of women's experience in the
family has been care at the expense of self. Some feminists contend
that such female self-sacrifice, far from being a virtue, should be
regarded as a gender-based injury. 35 We mention these critiques, not
fully to endorse them, but to raise some questions about family that
most civil society-revivalists have not adequately addressed.
From the vantage point of such critiques, revivalists give
insufficient attention to the problem of unequal power in civil society
and the consequences for women's own self-constitution and
ultimately for their status as free and equal citizens in our
constitutional democracy. Rights of privacy, religious freedom, and
freedom of association, which revivalists assume foster civil society by
protecting a realm of freedom for individual and associative activity,
may thwart women's agency by keeping the state out of the "private"
realm. 136 We disagree with this line of feminist critique to the extent
that it regards such a state of affairs as a necessary feature of
liberalism or of liberal constitutionalism. 37 Although we reject any
wholesale insistence upon "congruence" between civil society and
democratic values, we believe that it is justifiable for government to
138
take measures to attempt to secure equal citizenship for women.
133. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTrUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994).
134. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).

For Rawls'

sympathetic response to Okin, see Rawls, supra note 89, at 787-94.
135. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997). Carol Gilligan identified an "ethic of
care" as characteristic of women's moral reasoning, but also noted the risk of the equation of
care with female self-sacrifice. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
136. This is a familiar line of feminist argument. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 133; Mary E.
Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992); Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1657 (1997).
137. See McClain, supra note 7; McClain, supra note 110.
138. For example, in addition to protecting against private violence and abuse within the
home (e.g., the Violence Against Women Act), a government committed to securing equal
citizenship for women may seek to provide democratic education, promote public values of
equality, toleration, and respect, and prohibit various forms of "private" discrimination. Such
measures may serve to promote norms of gender justice and gender equality that are critical of,
and may counter, the internal norms inculcated through families and other associations. See
McClain, supra note 110, at 110-15. Also, to the extent that Rosenblum is correct about the
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Nonetheless, this line of feminist critique issues an important
challenge to revivalists to focus upon the problems of domination and
inequality in civil society and to consider the proper degree of
governmental regulation of civil society to address those problems. It
is troubling that when civic and moral revivalists set forth their
programs to strengthen families and to stem family fragmentation,
problems due to family violence and domination receive virtually no
139
attention.

At the same time, feminist work on the family highlights
women's particular role in sustaining civil society and generating
social capital: Women's histories reveal the prominence of care and
connection in their lives and in their moral thinking and theory. Law
and politics afford inadequate attention to or support for those
values, such work contends, and our public life should be transformed
by the insights gained from women's experience as caretakers, and
especially as mothers.14°
Now, in the discourse on reviving civil society, there is often
recognition that it is women, and particularly mothers, who have done
the heavy lifting when it comes to moral education of children and
preparation of them for citizenship, not only within the family but
"personal uses of pluralism," if government fosters the conditions for such use, it promotes the
possibility through "shifting involvements" of personal and institutional revision, or
reconstitution of the institutions within civil society. For example, if the family is one among
many associations, it is possible that a woman raised in a household with a traditional division of
labor may, through membership in associations, come to a revised self-understanding,
expectation, and desire, which may lead her to try to reconstruct or to exit from that family.
139. Both reports are silent on the issue. Glendon acknowledges that the presence of
violence and abuse within some families leads some people to be skeptical about the role of
families as seedbeds of virtue. GLENDON, supra note 26, at 182. Galston states that "[d]omestic
violence is not a private matter, and it cannot be condoned." Galston, supra note 10, at 607.
140. See Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY 339 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); WEST, supra note 135. What
could women's experience in the family contribute to political theory? Some feminists suggest
that: (1) the mother-child paradigm offers a more promising model for social relationships than
do models of social contract or economic man; (2) a focus on the mother-child paradigm offers a
good basis for establishing trust and the idea of obligations toward dependent persons; and (3)
women's caretaking experiences suggest that not all obligations are voluntary or the result of
contract, and thus could help to secure acceptance of binding obligations to help the vulnerable.
See Virginia Held, Non-ContractualSociety: A Feminist View, in FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY
209 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995); Mansbridge, supra at 339. Internal
feminist critiques have raised some instructive concerns, such as whether mothering-a
hierarchical, nonreciprocal relationship of dependency-can usefully serve as a model for
relationships among citizens, in which principles of equality, reciprocity, and justice should
feature centrally. See Carol C. Gould, Feminism and Democratic Community Revisited, in
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra at 396, 405-06. Both of us support the general proposition
that women's experience in the family can contribute to political theory, although we are
skeptical about the particular foregoing propositions, and elsewhere one of us has criticized
them. See McClain, supra note 103, at 1196-1203, 1263-64.
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For example,

Glendon speaks of women's special role in the family and suggests
the transformative potential for politics and public life of women's
traditions of care and nurturing connections.1 2 What is less common

in such revivalist discourse is recognition of the problems of
domination and inequality as identified by feminist work. As
Mansbridge puts it: "Among women, the experience of unequal
power is as universal as the experience of connection.'

143

Although

there are occasional nods in this direction in revivalist work, overall
there is little attention to the extent to which women, at the time of
the founding and subsequently, were simultaneously regarded as
transmitters of virtue and excluded from full citizenship (virtue being

defined in masculine terms within republicanism) or the extent to
which law and culture narrowly prescribed married women's rights
and responsibilities. Instead, to the extent that the contemporary

academic treatment of marriage echoes feminist recognition of the
dangers of marriage for women and of the acceptability of alternative
family forms, some revivalists complain of a "textbook assault on

marriage."144
But just what is the potential of the family as a seedbed of civic
virtue or as a model for democracy? A striking feature of some

feminist work on the family is the attempt simultaneously to hold
onto the mother-child relationship as a helpful model of the benign
side of connection and to criticize the male-female sexual and marital
relationships as the malignant side of connection. 45 Taken together,
these two dimensions of feminist work suggest the challenge of

formulating a useful feminist conception of the proper role of families
141. See GLENDON, supra note 26, at 174; William A. Galston, Won't You Be My
Neighbor?, AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1996, at 17; see also Kathryn Kish Sklar, A Historical
Model of Women's Voluntarism, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra
note 2, at 185 (discussing how traditions of voluntarism and of limited government led women's
voluntary organizations in the Progressive Era to address many social problems).
142. GLENDON, supra note 26, at 174.
143. Mansbridge, supra note 140, at 362.
144. Norval Glenn, A Textbook Assault on Marriage, RESPONSIVE COMMUNrrY, Fall 1997,
at 56, 56 (describing the findings of a study by the Institute for American Values, a co-sponsor
(with the University of Chicago Divinity School) of the Council on Civil Society, which issued
the report, A Call to Civil Society, see supra note 11). This is not to deny that, although
influential studies of marriage have concluded that marriage has significant costs for women
(more than for men), some more recent social scientists have found that marriage has benefits
for women as well as men. For discussion, see Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of
RelationalFeminism: Robin West's Caringfor Justice, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 477, 508-09 (1999).
145. See WEST, supra note 135, at 1-2. For a critique of West's account that is otherwise
sympathetic, see McClain, supra note 144; see also Held, supra note 140, at 228-29.
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in a liberal democracy. For even though such accounts value care and
connection, they recognize the problem that unequal distribution of
responsibility for such care imposes costs on women and burdens
their equal participation in society. It is in this approach toward
connection within the family that such feminists diverge most sharply
from most revivalists. Fatherless families are viewed by most
revivalists as the leading indicator (and a cause) of the crisis in civil
society. 146 Yet on some feminist views, fatherless families might seem
to offer an alternative to patriarchy. Indeed, Martha Fineman argues
against the sexual dyad between women and men as the basis for the
on
family, arguing instead for focusing on the "Mother/Child dyad";
147
her model, the state should subsidize the latter nurturing units.
Can the family be transformed along feminist lines to make it a
more equal institution, one that honors women's status as free and
equal citizens and facilitates their full participation in political and
civic life? To update a question from the Ladies Home Journal:"Can
marriage be saved?" Or should it be saved? Civil society-revivalists
condemn divorce (which women initiate more frequently than men)
and nonmarital family forms as indicia of civic and moral decline, and
argue for governmental measures to discourage both.148 They might
view increases in divorce and decisions to opt out of marriage as
evidence of an ascendance of adults selfishly putting their happiness
above the well-being of children. 149 But there are important issues of
sex equality, including sex role expectations and unequal distribution
of power and responsibilities within marriage, that may offer
146. See Blankenhorn, supra note 44, at 275-76; see also BLANKENHORN, supra note 127.
Indeed, A Call to Civil Society mentions, as a "public example" of "behavior that violates the
norm of personal responsibility," "[a] pop star announces that she wants a baby but not a
husband." A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 5.
147. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226-36 (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Family in Civil Society, 75 CI.-KENT L. REV. 531 (2000). We do not understand why
Professor Elshtain attributes these ideas to us or why she charges us with "a willingness to
entertain... the possibility that men can just take a hike." See Elshtain, supra note 11, at 591.
Our own approach, as we hope we make clear in this section of the article, is to argue for the
reconstruction of marriage along more inclusive, egalitarian lines and for the instantiation of
care as a public value. Morever, Fineman uses the gendered term "Mother/Child dyad" as a
metaphor for the social practice of caretaking that addresses inevitable dependency (rather than
as a literal and exclusive biological category), but she believes that "men can and should be
Mothers" that is, engage in caretaking. See FINEMAN, supra at 234-35. Elsewhere, one of us has
favorably discussed Fineman's call for public support for caregiving. See Linda C. McClain,
Toward a Formative Project to Secure Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000).
14& See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 19-20; A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 13.
149. See A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 7.
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persuasive explanations for many women's resistance to marrying, or
their willingness to exit marriage and to pursue motherhood apart
from marriage-even as some of these women continue to affirm
belief in marriage as an institution. 51 0 Marriage is an institution in the
midst of transformation, just as traditional gender roles within
marriage and the larger society are the subject of contestation and
reconstruction. Revivalists neglect a promising approach that would
focus on some of the sources of discontent within marriage (such as
women's double burden) and on institutional reconstruction of
marriage (such as the ideal of "peer marriage," i.e., an egalitarian
conception of rights, responsibilities, and the exercise of power within
marriage), which might address that discontent as well as the problem
of women's double burden within marriage.151 Moreover, some
feminist proponents of same-sex marriage argue for the critical
transformative potential of same-sex marriage to put in question
inequality and hierarchy based on gender roles within heterosexual
marriage.'52
Focusing upon the family as an important site of social
reproduction and caregiving could afford an important opportunity to
argue that supporting the work of social reproduction is a public
responsibility, and to attempt to instantiate care as a public value.
(Indeed, this could be a common goal shared by civil society-

revivalists and many feminists and liberals.)153 This would provide a
150. See Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 26 (reporting results
of study of low-income single mothers' attitudes about marriage and what factors prevent them
from marrying; also noting the role of low-income women's distrust of men and their
requirement that potential husband be economically stable). For a provocative argument that
low marriage rates among African-Americans are due in significant part to the gender attitudes
of African-American men, see ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES
OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES 161-65 (1998).
151. See PEPPER SCHWARTZ, PEER MARRIAGE: How LOVE BETWEEN EQUALS REALLY
WORKS (1994); Pepper Schwartz, Peer Marriage, RESPONSIVE COMMuNITY, Summer 1998, at
48; see also McClain, supra note 144, at 506-10. Interestingly, Amitai Etzioni advocates peer
marriage as part of a communitarian reconstruction of the family. ETZIONI, supra note 50, at
179-80.
152- See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. &
SEXUALITY 9, 16-19 (1991); Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1329-34 (1997). For a cautionary view
about the regulatory effect of marriage upon its participants, see Katherine M. Franke,
Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages,11 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999).
153. For examples of liberal and feminist calls for a national conversation about America's
"care crisis" and the need to instantiate care as a public value, see MONA HARRINGTON, CARE
AND EQUALITY (1999) (arguing for a reform of liberal politics); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2000) (arguing for recognition of the "subsidy" provided by the
society-preserving work done by families); see also Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value:
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foundation for thinking creatively about institutional reform that
would support care, understood as "essential to human health" and
"balanced development," including "developing human moral
potential."' 14 Human development literature looking at the issue of
care in a more global perspective finds that "the role of care in the
formation of human capabilities and in human development is
fundamental" not only for children, but also for adults, and that "the
expansion of markets tends to penalize altruism and care.1155 It also
finds that "both individuals and institutions have been free-riding on
' 156
the caring labour that mainly women provide.
A more explicit focus on care also might lead civil societyrevivalists to focus on the problems raised by women's
disproportionate responsibility for care in an "invisible human
ecology of care" involving women both as unpaid and paid
caregivers.57 It also could build on the revivalists' recognition that

market forces are not necessarily compatible with civic health 158 by
offering a powerful vantage point from which to critique the ways in
which current economic arrangements impinge upon families and
devalue care, as well as the human costs of policies championed as
furthering "efficiency" and productivity. 59 Moral revivalists advance
the goal that parents should spend more time with their children, and
lament a state of affairs in which "for most Americans in recent

Foundations for Public Responsibility (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Feminist Legal
Theory Workshop, Children: Public Good or Individual Responsibility?, Cornell Law School,
Nov. 19-20, 1999) (examining liberal, feminist, and civic republican sources for instantiating care
as a public value).
154. HARRINGTON, supra note 153, at 48-49. Harrington argues that "to assure good care to
all members of the society should become a primary principle of our common life, along with
the assurance of liberty, equality, and justice." Id. at 48.
155. The Invisible Heart-Care and the Global Economy, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1999, at 77, 79 (United Nations Development Programme, 1999) [hereinafter The
Invisible Heart].
156. Id.
157. Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Nanny Chain, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 32
(describing the human costs of "global care chain," or "invisible human ecology of care," linking
rich and poor countries, when first world mothers depend on nannies emigrated from Third
World countries, who in turn depend on other caregivers to care for the children left behind;
and arguing for raising the value of caring work and for getting fathers to contribute more child
care). For example, the use of the gender-neutral term "parent" in A Call to Civil Society tends
to mask this unequal burden. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 19.
158. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 10-11; A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 40.
159. See Martha McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2000) (concluding that "the double standard which
holds that public support for capital, not care taking, will promote the overall public good rests
on ideological faith-and political power-more than economic evidence").
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decades, our roles as workers and consumers have gotten thicker and
more dominant, while our roles as family members and neighbors
have grown thinner and weaker." 160 Nonetheless, they evidently hold

back from pursuing any ambitious program to instantiate care as a
core public value (and care for children as a crucial component of that
value) and from undertaking institutional reform necessary to achieve
that end. Instead, they turn to exhortation of individual employers to
take comparatively modest steps toward more flexible working
arrangements "wherever possible. ' 161 The challenge in thinking about

care is to find ways to nurture human capabilities that avoid the
gendered division of labor and that aim at a fairer distribution of
labor between men and women and among government, family,

community, and employer. 162
Finally, to the extent that civil society-revivalists' prescriptions

for the family implicate the "war over the family," or at least family
forms, we disagree with their apparent assumption that civic virtue
requires one family form, that of a heterosexual, two-parent, married
family.163 We share Rawls' view that while government has a
legitimate concern with the functions that families perform, "no

particular form of the family.., is required by a political conception
of justice so long as the family is arranged to fulfill these tasks [of
social reproduction] effectively and doesn't run afoul of other
political values."' 64 A functional approach to family policy would be
160. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 13, 15,24. For a liberal argument for such
a public value, and specific proposals for reform, see HARRINGTON, supra note 153.
161. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 24. As Martha Fineman observes, in this
symposium, civil society-revivalists' reliance on exhortation or cajoling business, labor, and
economic institutions to perform their civic responsibilities contrasts with their calls to reform
marriage and divorce laws. Fineman, supranote 147, at 538.
162. As one recent study concludes:
The nurturing of human capabilities has always been difficult and expensive. In the
past it was assured by a gender division of labour based on the subordination of
women. Today, however, the cost of providing caring labour should be confronted
explicitly and distributed fairly- between men and women, and among the state, the
family, or community and the employer.
The Invisible Heart,supranote 155, at 83.
163. Both reports appear to make this assumption in the sense that their discussions of "the
family" and of its importance for moral and civic renewal clearly presuppose the heterosexual,
two-parent, married family. See, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 7, 18; A
NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 13. Both reports are silent on the issue of same-sex
marriage.
164. Rawls, supra note 89, at 788 n.60. This view is supported by a commitment to a
principle of toleration for diverse comprehensive moral views concerning intimate association,
by a concomitant commitment to refraining from imposing a particular orthodoxy about how
best to order one's family life, and by concerns for sex equality and antidiscrimination
principles. Professor Elshtain correctly states that we, drawing upon this passage from Rawls,
"embrace a 'functional approach to family policy,"' but goes on to state that "there are serious
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more inclusive, and would reach same-sex parents (nowhere
mentioned in either A Call to Civil Society or A Nation of Spectators)
who, social science evidence suggests, can be competent, loving

parents who can adequately perform the responsibilities of social
reproduction.165 A more constructive, and less divisive, approach to

family policy would be to address such matters as the moral and
political importance of families, how best to reconstruct the family
and other institutions of civil society to meet the needs of children
and to redistribute responsibility, and-to the extent that the erosion

of civil society reflects decreases in women's voluntary activities and
childcare in light of changed patterns of family life and workforce
participation -what alternative sources of social capital exist or might
be fortified. 166
problems with the functionalist approach to family life," and. even goes so far as to attribute
Talcott Parsons' functionalist theory of "systems maintenance" to us and to Rawls! See
Elshtain, supra note 11, at 591. With all due respect, embracing a "functional approach" in a
generic sense is not the same thing as taking "the functionalist approach," much less a
"functionalist" approach in Parsons' specific sense. Neither we nor Rawls embrace a
"functionalist" approach to family policy that is unconcerned with the well-being of childrenand certainly not a functionalist approach inspired by Parsons-and there is no basis in our
writing for saying that we do. Furthermore, Elshtain's statement that Rawls "gives no account
of moral development, but he does privilege, like Parsons, the 'needs' of the 'macro-order,"' id.
at 592, is groundless. Indeed, on Rawls' view, families are to perform the function of "ensuring
[children's] moral development." See supra text accompanying note 131. We do not understand
how anyone who has read Rawls could propound this interpretation or make this charge. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 453-504 (1971) (discussing the acquisition of a sense of
justice and the stages of moral development); see also OKIN,supra note 134, at 97-100 (offering
a sympathetic critique of Rawls' "much-neglected" account of childhood moral development).
165. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(finding that expert testimony supported that gay and lesbian parents can be "as fit and loving
parents, as non-gay men and women and different-sex couples" and that, because the state
failed to demonstrate that its compelling interest in the optimal development of children
required that families consist of married, biological (or at least heterosexual) parents, excluding
gay men and lesbians from marriage was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the
laws); see also Baker v. Vermont, No. 98-032, 1999 WL 1211709, at *35 (Vt. Dec. 20, 1999)
("The laudable governmental goal of promoting a commitment between married couples to
promote the security of their children and the community as a whole provides no reasonable
basis for denying the legal benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples, who are no
differently situated with respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts."). For
conflicting assessments of the social science evidence, compare Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential
Impact of Homosexual Parentingon Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 833 (contending that social
science literature suggests that children in same-sex families are harmed by the intimate
relationships of their parents and arguing for a rebuttable presumption of harm in the law), with
Carlos A. Ball & Janice Fareell Pea, Warring With Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay
and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 253 (rebutting Wardle's assessment of the social
science literature and arguing that gay and lesbian parents should be evaluated individually on
basis of their ability to be good parents instead of on assumptions based on sexual orientation).
166. Of course, civil society-revivalists might respond that, even accepting a functional
approach to family, social science evidence supports the premise that two-parent families are
better for children and that children in single-parent families fare worse. This social science
debate is ongoing, and here we do not seek to assess, or to add to, the underlying empirical
literature. Undisputably, poverty is harmful for children, and single-parent families generally
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D. Have Gains in Equality and Liberty Causedthe Decline of Civil

Society?
In some of the calls for reviving civil society, there is a troubling
moral accounting that seems to juxtapose, on the one hand, gains in
equal citizenship and the extension of civil rights and liberties to
minorities and women against, on the other hand, losses in civic
virtue, the erosion of civil society, and the emergence of serious
moral, civic, or social problems. In such an accounting, the trade-off
for the benefits of the civil rights movements in extending full
citizenship to African-Americans, women, and other groups
previously denied such citizenship has been the breakdown of civil
society. We will mention the work of two serious and thoughtful
scholars, William A. Galston and James Q. Wilson.
Galston argues that it is a debatable question "whether the
cultural revolution of the past generation has left the United States
better or worse off," for "[a]lthough the civil rights movement is
widely acknowledged to have righted ancient wrongs, epidemics of
167
crime, drugs, and teenage pregnancy have exacted a fearful tol."

We certainly concede that the latter are serious problems. But what
are poorer than two-parent families. But a functional approach should also be attentive to
broader questions of social justice (e.g., whether the current distribution of resources be used as
the baseline from which to measure one's moral entitlement to have children), and to issues of
sex and race equality. The proposition that persons should not become parents until they are
ready to accept the concomitant responsibilities seems inarguable. However, the common
statement that only people who can afford to have children should do so tends to slight such
questions and issues, as well as to ignore the extent to which the government does subsidize
families (e.g., without the Earned Income Tax Credit, many working poor families could not
"afford" to have children). One dilemma that single-parent families bring to the fore is that of
attempting to combine market labor with caregiving labor and the invisibility, in the traditional
breadwinner/caregiver two-parent family, of the vital work of nurture and social reproduction
that is usually performed by mothers and other women.
Rather than adopting public policies that give preferences for various governmental
benefits to two-parent marital families, as moral revivalists advocate, it might be a more
productive avenue of public policy to find ways to support such families without undermining or
stigmatizing single-parent families. For example, it seems unfair, if not perverse, to adopt
welfare reform based on the premise that "personal responsibility" requires that mothers
receiving welfare must work (to support their children), and then to adopt preferential policies
that undercut those mothers' ability to work out of a fear that, if mothers are too successful in
moving from welfare to work, this may have the effect of deterring other women from entering
marriage. See David T. Ellwood, Anti-Poverty Policy for Families in the Next Century: From
Welfare to Work-and Worries (unpublished paper, presented at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, Nov. 17, 1999) (noting that "the real conundrum in this
domain is that although there is little evidence that social policy had a major influence on family
formation, some policymakers fear that increasing the capacity of single parents to provide for
their families might increase the formation of such homes").
167. GALSTON, supra note 26, at 273; see also Galston, supra note 10, at 608-11; Galston,
supra note 141, at 11-14.
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do the gains have to do with the losses, that is, what does the civil
rights movement have to do with such problems? Galston claims that
society used to have more civic virtue and a "dominant and effective"
cultural consensus (namely, one that gave WASP men a dominant
position in society), while acknowledging that there were some unjust
aspects, such as racial inequality and segregation, gender inequality
within the household and workplace, and the marginal status of
certain ethnic and religious groups. Thus, he grants that the civil
rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s properly attacked
undeniable injustice toward and exclusion of groups like
African-Americans from full membership in society. For Galston,
however, the civil rights movements in effect opened a Pandora's Box
that let loose an indiscriminate attack, in the name of equality and
liberty, on all hierarchies and authority that formed part of traditional
morality and cultural consensus, and that unleashed a demand for the
legitimation of difference, in whatever form, with dire consequences
for civil society and the polity. 168
Similarly, in Seedbeds of Virtue, Wilson comments on the
difficulty of reckoning up "the balance sheet of [the] sea change in the
culture of liberalism.' 169 He bemoans a movement away from the
traditional morality that "ordinary men and women" lived under for
centuries-which included "a firm attachment to the fundamental
virtues of daily life, a desire for liberty tempered by moderation,
[and] a willingness to judge other people on the basis of standards
they
thought
were
universal"- toward
modernism
and
postmodernism-which includes "extreme understandings of liberty
and equality" and "relativistic views of human nature.' '7 0 He writes:
I began by recalling the familiar facts of crime, drug abuse, divorce,
and illegitimacy, but it is time to recall as well what else has
changed. Slavery has been abolished and segregation rolled back;
mass higher education has produced a vastly more sophisticated
and talented population; and women are less often the victims of a
sexual double standard. Against those gains we must measure the
increased tolerance of drug experimentation, the social
marginalization of religious believers, the heightened skepticism
about institutional authority, and a certain confusion over sexual

168. GALSTON, supra note 26, at 268-70. Some prominent civil society-revivalists claim that,
although contemporary Americans long for community, they resist the authority necessary to
maintain it. See EBERLY, supra note 25, at 8-12.
169. James Q. Wilson, Liberalism, Modernism, and the Good Life, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE,
supra note 8, at 17, 29.
170. Id. at 20, 25, 26.
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roles. 171

Wilson's balance sheet appears either to represent a rather mixed
assortment of factors or to reflect a highly questionable etiology of
decline. Again, what do the gains have to do with the supposed
losses? 172 And how have gains in racial and gender equality caused
such supposed problems and indeed the decline of civil society?
In any event, Wilson's moral accounting, like Galston's, seems to
make the disturbing assumption that more equality and liberty leads
to less virtue, and that the trade-off for a more just and inclusive
society is a regrettable sacrifice of traditional morality and cultural
consensus. These troubling juxtapositions and accountings appear to
manifest ambivalence about pluralism and the value of individual
autonomy, or personal self-government, 73 as well as anxiety about the
possibility of finding a basis for social solidarity and trust without
moral consensus and, in fact, moral truths. Indeed, it is well to recall
that the subtitle of A Call to Civil Society- of which both Wilson and
' 74
Galston are signatories -is "Why Democracy Needs Moral Truths.'
Have these changes brought about a decline in civic virtue and
an erosion of civil society? It is problematic to look backwards for a
time when virtue was more abundant, for the history of America
includes shameful exclusion of categories of persons from citizenship
and full membership in society. To be sure, many civil societyrevivalists recognize the importance of avoiding the "nostalgia
trap. ' 175 For example, A Call to Civil Society reports that among its
signatories "there is little desire to 'go back' to some earlier era,' ' 7 6
and A Nation of Spectators reports that "[i]n recent decades,
important social movements have helped protect individual rights and
have brought long-suppressed voices into our public dialogue."' 77
Nonetheless, some revivalists seem to engage in selective retrieval,
171. Id. at 29.
172. With all due respect to Professor Wilson, we are dubious about some of these supposed
losses, e.g., "the social marginalization of religious believers," the reports of which we believe
have been greatly exaggerated, and "a certain confusion over sexual roles," if by this he means
to refer to liberals and feminists challenging traditional assumptions about sexual roles and to
gay men and lesbians coming out of the closet to challenge such assumptions.
173. Galston's work generally does not manifest such ambivalence about pluralism. In his
book Liberal Purposes, whose subtitle is Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, he
has provided a rich substantive account of liberal democratic virtues that are appropriate for a
culturally and morally diverse society. GALSTON, supra note 26.
174. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11.
175. See generally COMMUNITY WORKS, supra note 2.
176. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 5.
177. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 5.
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evidently assuming that this history of exclusion was an unfortunate
element of history that can be easily removed (like a weed among the
seedbeds), and they fail to consider whether such a history seriously
undermines the very notion of a more virtuous past. 17 8 Rogers
Smith's powerful book, Civic Ideals, seriously questions the argument
or assumption that racism, sexism, and nativism were simply
marginal, unfortunate aspects of that past. Smith advances the thesis,
borne out by extensive historical evidence, that the history of United
States citizenship laws is one "shot through with forms of second-class
citizenship, denying personal liberties and opportunities for political
participation to most of the adult population on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, and even religion,"' 179 reflecting the view of

American civic identity that "true Americans were native-born men
with Anglo-Saxon ancestors." 18
Beyond this notion of a moral accounting, there is also the idea

that rights and responsibilities are out of balance with one another.
Civil society-revivalists carry forward certain themes sounded nearly

a decade ago in prominent critiques of rights and "rights talk," in
particular, that there is an imbalance between rights and
responsibilities, and that the responsible exercise of rights that makes
"ordered liberty" possible requires that persons possess certain
virtues and traits of character.181 The argument seems to be that

America's "absolutist" rights rhetoric, tempered neither by notions of
responsibility and obligation nor by the mores of a healthy civil
society, leads to an imbalance between rights and responsibilities, to

the impoverishment of political discourse, and ultimately to the
incapacity for self-government. 1 2 Self-government, on such an
178. We do not mean to suggest that Galston makes such an assumption regarding this
history of exclusion. In this symposium, Dorothy Roberts argues that civil society-revivalists
seem forgetful of the pervasive, systemic racism in the history of the United States and that their
program for attacking "moral decline" fails to give a central place to social justice and to
rectifying the contemporary effects of such an immoral history. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral
Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 555 (2000). Battles in recent years
over public monuments illustrate the problems raised in the text. See SANFORD LEVINSON,
WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998).
179. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.

HISTORY 2 (1997).
180. Id. at 3.
181. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (citing many of the leading sources and
noting that some of the earlier critics of rights talk are prominent voices in the calls to revive
civil society). A striking formulation is Senator Orrin Hatch's invocation of Tocqueville: "Thus,
while the law allows the American people to do everything, there are things which religion
prevents them from imagining and forbids them to dare." Orrin G. Hatch, A Dependence on the
People, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 961 (1992) (citing TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 34, at 269).
182 See GLENDON, supra note 26.
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account, requires "government of the self" and the virtue of selfrestraint.183 A Nation of Spectators asks: "Can we relentlessly pursue
individual choice at the expense of mutual obligation without
corroding vital social bonds? Will we remain secure in the enjoyment
of our individual rights if we fail to accept and discharge our
responsibilities?"' 184 Furthermore, it contends that "Americans today
place less value on what we owe others as a matter of moral
obligation and common citizenship; less value on personal sacrifice as
a moral good; less value on the social importance of respectability and
observing the rules; less value on restraint in matters of pleasure and
sexuality; and correspondingly greater value on self-expression, selfrealization, and personal choice."' 18 Therefore, the noble idea of
"ordered liberty" has degenerated into the idea of "liberty as
license": Expansive understandings of individual rights to liberty,
autonomy, or personal choice, spawned by liberalism's culture of
"expressive individualism," have corroded the virtues necessary for
democracy. 186 Elsewhere, one of us has thoroughly criticized such
critiques of rights and "rights talk,"'18 7 and we will not repeat those
criticisms here.
To be sure, A Nation of Spectators is not altogether hostile to
rights and "rights talk," for it affirms that "all human beings possess
fundamental rights" (such as "freedom of religion, of speech, of the
press, and of assembly") and posits that "government's essential
purpose is to protect those rights."' 88 (A Call to Civil Society is not as
forthright about rights.) Still, perhaps because revivalists seek to
correct a perceived imbalance between rights and responsibilities, the
reports contain very little "rights talk" and much more talk of
fortifying a sense of personal responsibility and mutual obligation.
There is a striking absence in the reports of appeals to rights, or to
any national governmental initiatives that implicate rights, as ways of
advancing the goals of civic and moral renewal. 189 But it is important

183. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 8; see also A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY,

supra note 11, at 7.
184. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 7.

185. Id.
186. See id. at 6-8; see also A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 16.
187. See McClain, supra note 26.
188. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 7.
189. For example, the reports seem to contemplate that citizens may have obligations to
persons who are economically disadvantaged, but there is no suggestion that the latter have any
reciprocal right entailed by the former's obligation. Indeed, Galston contends that the "right to
welfare" is a "bogus right." Galston, supra note 10, at 605.
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to remember that national initiatives to secure rights have been
central, if not indispensable, to pursuing equal citizenship for racial
and ethnic minorities and for women.19°
There is another type of moral accounting in the discourse about
civil society that is less problematic than those of Galston and Wilson.
On this sort of account, the trade-off for a more inclusive definition of
citizenship is a decline in social solidarity and trust and the loss of
civil society, understood as the classical idea of face-to-face
interactions in a small republic with a homogeneous people. In The
Idea of Civil Society, Adam Seligman argues that the basis for
membership in society has changed from belonging to various
associations and particular groups to inclusion in the more universal
category of the autonomous, rights-bearing citizen. He argues that
America has served throughout the world as the "paradigm" of a
"truly 'civil society' precisely because of its idea of moral
personhood as the basis for political community and its history of the
gradual realization of the category of universal citizenship. 191 (Of
course, this view should be read against Smith's less benign view of
this supposed unfolding dynamic.) And yet, the "paradox of modern
society" is that "the very universalization of trust in
citizenship... undermines the concrete mutuality and shared
components of the moral community upon which trust is based.
Hence the call for a return to civil society." 19 The problem, Seligman
contends, is that universal citizenship affords an inadequate
foundation for social solidarity and trust because it is so abstract and
empty of the face-to-face interactions of the classical idea of civil
society. Moreover, although liberal and progressive nationalists
attempt to find a model of American citizenship that is both strong
and inclusive, some scholars contend that such inclusive citizenship is
an inevitably weak bond because it competes with other stronger
membership bonds.1 93
This type of moral accounting usefully identifies the problems of
190. Galston writes that "[t]he civil rights movement a generation ago triggered an
outpouring of pent-up demands throughout our society for the recognition of long-denied
rights." William A. Galston, Political Economy and the Politics of Virtue: US. Public
Philosophy at Century's End, GOOD SOC'Y, Winter 1998, at 1, 10. He continues: "While few
question the appropriateness of this recognition, some public intellectuals are now expressing
doubts about the general 'culture of rights' to which it has given rise." Id.; see also ELSHTAIN,
supra note 2; Elshtain, supra note 11.
191. SELIGMAN, supra note 121, at 186.
192 Id. at 187.
193. See Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1999) (reviewing
SMITH, supra note 179); see also infra text accompanying notes 230-31.
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trust and social solidarity amidst difference as fundamental. What is
the glue that holds society together and that motivates persons to
cooperate? Can there be social solidarity or even social cooperation
in a heterogeneous, diverse society? Civic revivalists offer one
promising path in questing for a "constitutional faith." Tellingly, as
Galston suggests in recent work questing for a basis for political unity
in the face of the demise of the "informal cultural establishment of
the beliefs and mores of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants" and the rise
in identity politics, "it is clear that no such establishment can or
should serve as the basis of national unity." 194 Rather, "the
alternative to a common culture would seem to be a revitalized
understanding of political unity," that is, a "constitutional faith." 195
We also believe that the conception of civil society that we
endorse, which allows for a multiplicity of sites in which public
deliberation, contestation, and argument can take place, is helpful. In
addition, we believe that feminist and liberal works offer helpful
building blocks for a model of civil society that contemplates social
cooperation and trust among different, but free and equal, citizens.
We will mention two examples here. First, feminist critiques of
communitarian invocations of community suggest that we cannot and
should not go home again to those homogeneous and exclusionary
communities of the past- "communities of place"-which devalued
difference and included elements of subordination. Instead, we
should develop models of community that recognize and appreciate
difference. Marilyn Friedman suggests that "unchosen communities
are sometimes communities we can and should leave" in favor of
"communities of choice," or voluntary communities. She observes:
"Perhaps it is more illuminating to say that communities of choice
foster not so much the constitution of subjects as their
reconstitution."' 96 A helpful feminist inquiry might be to "identify the
that provide nonoppressive and enriched lives
sorts of communities
7
for women.' ' 9
Second, Rawls' political liberalism posits that reasonable
194. Galston, supra note 190, at 9.
195. ld. (mentioning SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988)).
196. Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modem Friendship:Dislocating the Community, in
FEMINISM AND COMMUNrY, supra note 140, at 187,202-03.
197. Id. at 199; see Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J.
417, 440-46 (1997). Friedman and Iris Marion Young both point to the ideal of the
nonoppressive modem city as a model of solidarity without domination in circumstances of
difference. See Friedman, supra note 196; Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the
Politicsof Difference, in FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY, supra note 140, at 233.
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pluralism is a permanent feature of a constitutional democracy such

as our own, and that achieving uniformity concerning a conception of
the good as the basis of social and political unity is not possible
without the use of intolerably oppressive state power. 198 In the face of
the "fact of reasonable pluralism" and the related "fact of
oppression," political liberalism seeks to establish the preconditions

for social cooperation among free and equal citizens on the basis of
mutual respect and trust, 199 and even what Rawls calls civic
friendship. 20° It does so through securing basic liberties and the
preconditions for the exercise of persons' moral powers-which
correspond to what we have called deliberative democracy and

deliberative autonomy-and through requiring reciprocity and
honoring the moral duty of civility (including the constraints of public
reason) in deliberating about the common good. Excluding persons
from such basic terms of citizenship is, on this account, inherently
suspect.

Political liberalism assumes the formative role of the

institutions of civil society in shaping persons to engage in social
cooperation (subject to the principles of justice).
E. Should We Revive Civil Society or "A Civil Society?"
Some civil society-revivalists, especially moral revivalists, exploit
an ambiguity between the idea of "civil society" and that of "a civil
society." The ambiguity is this: "Civil society""is a realm between the
individual and the state, or besides the market and the state,

encompassing an array of associations such as family, religious
organizations, and other voluntary associations, whereas "a civil
society" is a society in which good manners flourish and certain
standards of civilized conduct are obeyed. 2 1 Thus, the lamentations
198. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 37,144.
199. Id.
200. Rawls, supra note 89, at 771.
201. Both reports express concern about the rise of incivility. A Call to Civil Society offers
the following definition and examples of uncivil behavior:
[T]he public understands weakening morality as behavior that is increasingly uncivilthat is, behavior that reflects a rejection of legitimate authority and a lack of respect
for others. Neighbors not being neighborly. Children disrespecting adults. Declining
loyalty between employers and employees. The absence of common courtesy, such as
indifference from retail clerks, or being treated like a number by impersonal
bureaucracies. Drivers who menace and gesture at other drivers. In general, people
who tend to push others aside, looking out only for themselves. Nearly 90 percent of
the public believes that this type of incivility is a serious national problem. About 80
percent believe that the problem has gotten worse in the past ten years.
A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 5. A Nation of Spectators deploys a more political
notion of civility:

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:301

over the decline of civil society are often accompanied by cries about
the rise of incivility.202 Indeed, Seedbeds of Virtue contains articles by
moral revivalists like Glendon side by side with an essay by Judith
Martin, a/k/a Miss Manners. Miss Manners suggests that "[o]beisance
to etiquette" is "the oldest social virtue and an indispensable partner
of morality" 2 3- since it "has been used to establish the principles of
social virtue as well as the rules, symbols, and rituals of civilized
life." 2°4 She poses the question: "[W]hat if the decline of etiquette is
one of the most serious social problems, from which other serious
social problems devolve merely as epiphenomena?" 2°5 Thus, civic
virtue becomes civility in the sense of good manners and etiquette.
More recently, Stephen Carter describes the current level of incivility
in America as "intolerable" and calls for an "etiquette of democracy,"
arguing that a "revival of civility... will require a revival of all that is
best in religion as a force in our public life. '"206
To this ambiguity we sketch three responses. First, even if both
the decline of civil society and the decline of civility are regrettable,
and both signal political or moral crises, they are not the same thing.
Civil society might break down despite excruciatingly correct and
civilized conduct; and civil society might thrive despite bad manners.
In fact, a vital civil society might lead to the debunking of the
manners and civility of the "elders and betters" in the polity. Some
lamentations over the decline in civility may be, in part, a cloak for
conservative, communitarian defenses of the status quo. Criticisms of
the status quo, however apt and compelling from the standpoint of
normative political theory and the Constitution's commitments to
liberty, equality, and justice, will usually seem uncivilized and
intemperate to defenders of the status quo - especially when those
criticisms come from or are made on behalf of persons or groups
historically excluded from full participation in the benefits of the
Civility does not mean eliminating passion and conflict from public discourse. Nor
does it mean agreement for agreement's sake. Civility means disagreeing with others
without demonizing them. It means respecting them as sincere patriots and as partners
in a shared quest for civic answers that are both practically effective and morally

compelling.
A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 4.
202. See Benjamin DeMott, Seduced by Civility: Political Manners and the Crisis of
Democratic Values, NATION, Dec. 9, 1996, at 11.
203. Judith Martin, The Oldest Virtue, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 61, 61.
204. Id. at 63.

205. Id.
206. STEPHEN L. CARTER, CMLrry: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETrE OF

DEMOCRACY 11, 18 (1998).
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status quo,"" persons or groups who often view their own protests as
reflecting their civic virtue.2
Second, some moral revivalists who confound "civil society" with
"a civil society" evidently do not understand, as Stephen Holmes has
put it, that "civil society" to some extent is "society 'civilized' by state
action." 209 They appear to yearn for a pre-political or politics-free
realm of civil society. They seem to want civil society to be civilized
without the state, perhaps to be civilized by good manners. But
citizens within civil society need to be civilized by the state in two
important respects: first, in the sense of honoring the moral duty of
civility and the constraints of public reason, to be explained below;
and second, in the sense of inculcating civic virtue, including the
disposition to care about, and the capacity to deliberate about, the
common good of the polity, not just about the good of their
associations within civil society.
Finally, and most importantly, many civil society-revivalists,
especially those who believe that liberal interpretations of the
Constitution as erecting a wall of separation between church and state
have contributed to the erosion of both civil society and civility, fail to
see that they are preaching incivility in the first sense just mentioned:
They advocate flouting what Rawls has called the moral duty of
210
civility by ignoring or rejecting the constraints of public reason.
These constraints seek to assure, at least where fundamental political
questions (in particular, constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice) are at stake, that political decisions will be justifiable on the
basis of public reason (or common ground): that is, on grounds that
citizens generally can reasonably be expected to endorse, whatever
207. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 51 (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975) (1859) ("[Ior
if the test be offence to those whose opinions are attacked, I think experience testifies that this
offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who
pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any
strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent."); DeMott, supra note 202, at 11
(discussing remarks by Randall Kennedy observing that nineteenth-century civility promoters
had charged abolitionists with incivility and stating that "if you're in an argument with a thug,
there are things much more important than civility"); see also Randall Kennedy, The Case
Against "Civility," AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 84.
208. See Harris, supra note 85, at 322 (describing a protester's sense of civic duty as a motive
for activism, and citing a finding by SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996)).
209. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 262 (1995).
210. See RAWLS, supra note 51, at 217, 212-54; Rawls, supra note 89. Rawls speaks of the
idea of public reason as imposing "a moral, not a legal, duty-the duty of civility." RAWLS,
supra note 51, at 217; see Rawls, supra note 89, at 769.
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their particular conceptions of the good, because they come within an
overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of justice,
rather than solely on the basis of particular comprehensive religious,
moral, or philosophical conceptions of the good. Rawls conceives the
idea of public reason as entailed by the moral duty of civility among
free and equal citizens who hold divergent religious, moral, or
philosophical conceptions of the good. These constraints and this
duty must be honored if free and equal citizens are to engage in social
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust in a
constitutional democracy such as our own, which is characterized by
the fact of reasonable pluralism and which recognizes the related fact
of oppression. Thus, some civil society-revivalists, despite their cries
about the decline of civility in the sense of good manners, may be
fomenting incivility in this more serious, significant sense.
Civil society-revivalists might charge that the constraints of
public reason unduly hinder citizens' pursuit of a formative project of
politics, inculcation of civic virtue through politics and civil society,
and deliberation through democratic procedures.
But these
constraints do not preclude a proper formative project of politics,
prevent inculcation of civic virtue, or unduly hinder deliberation. 211
The disposition to honor the moral duty of civility, including the
constraints of public reason, is a crucial component of civic virtue
properly conceived (as including concern for pursuing the common
good and the capacity to deliberate about it as well as concern for
finding common ground for political decisions). Citizens who reject
this duty of civility are thus lacking in civic virtue and are uncivilized
in both senses mentioned above. For they put their zealous quest for
the good as they see it above pursuing the common good and
common ground for decisions in a polity characterized by a diversity
of reasonable religious, moral, and philosophical views.
The question of the injustice of the family, and the problem of
the incivility of certain persons and associations who zealously seek to
impose their comprehensive conceptions of the good upon the diverse
polity, are aspects of a larger question: What if the supposed seedbeds
of virtue spawn "bad seeds" such as bad citizens and associations?212
211. See MACEDO, supra note 58 (developing a civic liberalism that would inculcate liberal

virtues and honor the constraints of public reason); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society:
School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations,and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 417 (2000) (same).
212. As noted above, both reports acknowledge this possibility.
See supra text
accompanying notes 52-61.
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What about persons, associations, and communities that reject civic
virtues such as concern for pursuing the common good and for
honoring the constraints of public reason, to say nothing of liberal
virtues such as toleration of diversity and respect for the liberty and
equality of all citizens? To qualify as a seedbed of virtue, must an
institution inculcate virtues that are significant preconditions for
democratic self-government? What if an institution inculcates views,
values, or attitudes that are inimical to democratic self-government,
e.g., racism, sexism, homophobia, and theocratic beliefs?
To some extent, the state (and the Constitution) may seek to
civilize such associations and to moderate such attitudes. But some of
the conduct and attitudes that are "bad seeds" and the fruit thereof
may be constitutionally protected. The revivalists do not seem to
have reckoned with the irony that "allowing [an] undemocratic
enclave group the power to govern themselves might further
democracy by reinforcing the Constitution's commitment to the value
of self-sovereignty. 213 Our aim here is not to resolve these questions.
Instead, we simply wish to note that the "bad seeds" might include
not just hate groups and groups who do not contribute to and indeed
undermine democratic self-government, but also groups who,
however law-abiding and God-fearing, maintain attitudes that are
corrosive of civic virtue, understood as including concern for the
common good and for common ground.
Tamir persuasively argues that the state should not insist upon
congruence between civil society and liberal democratic virtues, but
should protect freedom of association within civil society. She
observes, however, that "a constitutional shelter that protects
freedom of association and associational relationships from
unwarranted state intervention might not be enough. ' 214 She argues
that government should address, through education and financial
support, obstacles to enjoying the benefits of such protection; given
the differential resources of oppressed or disadvantaged groups in
society, government should also establish mechanisms to allocate
resources to such groups so that they can deliver the goods of
association to their members. 215 Furthermore, she contends that the
213. Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a Constitutional
Democracy: HasidicPublic Schools in Kiryas Joel, 72 IND. L.J. 383, 396 (1997). For a response,
see Sanford Levinson, On PoliticalBoundary Lines, Multiculturalism,and the Liberal State, 72

IND. L.J. 403 (1997).
214. Tamir, supra note 48, at 233.
215. See id. Tamir endorses Young's recommendation of creating "compensatory political
forms to ensure that such groups have an equal voice in agenda setting and policy formation."
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state should be "committed to balancing the harmful effects of
associational activities. '216 And it should "play an important role in
fostering liberal democratic virtues," for example, "in encouraging
21 7
political participation, public debate, and social cohesion."
Thus, civil society in some respects should be "civilized" by the
state through inculcation of such principles as freedom, equality, and
toleration. 218 This approach entails both that government should
engage in a limited formative project of instilling civic virtue and
promoting public values, and that citizens should adhere to a duty of
civility.
Elsewhere, one of us has argued for governmental
responsibility to undertake a formative project aimed at cultivating
the capacities for democratic and personal self-government. 2 9 This
project is compatible with key civic republican, feminist, and liberal
principles about the preconditions for good lives and a vital polity.
Such a formative project would aim at fostering moral capacities
necessary for self-government that would allow diverse citizens to
pursue their conceptions of justice and of the good, individually and
in association with others, within a constitutional framework that
protects basic rights and liberties. Thus, we emphatically reject the
charge that liberalism is "lethal," or that liberalism forbids any sort of
formative project that would cultivate civic virtues and moral
220
capacities.
F. Would a Revitalized Civil Society Support Democratic SelfGovernment or Supplant It?
Is a vital civil society a precondition for vigorous democratic selfgovernment or an alternative to it? Remarkably, many civil societyrevivalists, notwithstanding their worries about the decline of virtue
and the erosion of trust in our basic political institutions, are
Id.
216. Id. at 216.
217. Id. at 232.
21& See Hefner, supra note 74. For example, in this symposium, Stephen Macedo advocates

structuring educational voucher programs "with strings attached" so that such vouchers will
allow the more effective pursuit of public purposes (e.g., being more open and inclusive).
Macedo, supra note 211, at 418. For an argument that this attempts to inculcate civic virtue by
imposing or establishing a public orthodoxy, see Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism,75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 453 (2000).
219. See McClain, supra note 110.

220. In this view, we largely agree with Stephen Macedo and, to a lesser extent, William
Galston. See GALSTON, supra note 26; MACEDO, supra note 58; STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL

VIRTUES (1990).

One of us, however, has criticized certain aspects of Galston's work

elsewhere. See McClain, supra note 26.
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ambivalent about the value of government. For all their rhetoric
about civil society preparing people for citizenship and democratic
self-government, it is clear that many civil society-revivalists hope
that a revived civil society would supplant government (especially the
national government) to the extent that the institutions of civil society
would reclaim certain functions now performed, if at all, by
government. 22' The reinvigoration of civil society thus would entail
the withering away of the state or in any event the shrinking of the
22
national government.
Needless to say, civil society-revivalists do not reject out of hand
the need for government. And it is important to acknowledge
distinctions here between civic and moral revivalists. For example, A
Nation of Spectators rejects the debate between "proponents of
activist government" and "partisans of civil society" as
"unproductive," and suggests that "[t]here is no reason to believe that
221. See, e.g., Adam Meyerson, How Congress Can Champion Civic Renewal, POL'Y REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 6 (describing a model of "citizen legislators" in Congress who actively
encourage and help "private citizens and local governments to solve community problems
without federal interference"); see also GLENDON, supra note 26, at 141 (criticizing
interpretations of separation of church and state that would limit the ability of religious
organizations to play a role in meeting various social needs and praising Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589 (1988), for allowing the involvement of religious organizations in addressing the
problem of teen pregnancy as an "encouraging indicator of the Court's receptiveness to
Congressional efforts to transcend the state-market framework" and as sending a signal to the
elected branches that "more creative uses of the structures of civil society may now be
permissible in the American welfare state"); Hatch, supra note 181, at 962 (stating that
"individuals who are unable to govern themselves need a great deal of government"). Several
revivalists (e.g., Glendon, Galston, Blankenhorn, and Elshtain) are also affiliated with the
Responsive Communitarian movement, whose platform urges that government "should step in
only to the extent that other social subsystems fail" and states: "A good citizen is involved in a
community or communities, but not necessarily active in the polity."
The Responsive
CommunitarianPlatform: Rights and Responsibilities,supra note 26, at 4, 11, 12.
222. We should acknowledge that some revivalists who advocate the crucial role of civil
society in addressing certain social problems nonetheless caution against the inference that civil
society can do so without substantial governmental help. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Lord's
Work: The Church and Civil Society, in COMMUNITY WORKS, supra note 2, at 50-58 (describing
efforts of African-American inner-city ministers to prevent juvenile violence in Boston). But
this type of public-private partnership, particularly when it involves religious institutions, may
raise some significant constitutional as well as practical concerns. For example, the so-called
"Charitable Choice" provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 encourages religious groups to expand their involvement in
providing services to welfare recipients by allowing them to accept governmental funds while
permitting them to retain their "religious integrity" (by, for example, preserving a religious
atmosphere in their facilities and discriminating on the basis of religion in their hiring practices).
See Amy Sherman, Implementing "Charitable Choice": Transcending the Separation Between
Church and State, PHILANTHROPY, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 14, 15 (quoting Sen. John Ashcroft,
sponsor of the provision). Both moral and civic revivalists recommend that the President and
Congress "strengthen and expand" the 1996 "charitable choice" legislation "to all federal laws
[that] authorize government... to contract with non-governmental organizations to provide
services." A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 21; see also A NATION OF SPECTATORS,
supra note 10, at 17.
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reducing the size of government would automatically increase the
scope of voluntary activities. ' 223 The report affirms the crucial role of
local institutions, yet maintains that "reinvigorated localities cannot
substitute for effective national institutions," and identifies restoring
trust in our national government as a central task of civic renewal. 224
By contrast, it seems fair to say that many moral revivalists
champion local government over national government and espouse a
modest role at best for national government. A Call to Civil Society
explicitly posits that "the core challenge facing our nation today is not
primarily governmental or economic."'22 At the same time, it includes
local government among the seedbeds of virtue and treats it as a
"partial exception to the thesis that our basic challenge is not
governmental. '226 The report praises the structures of participatory
local government, which allow face-to-face civic engagement, as
"primary incubators of civic competence" and as transmitters of the
"particular skills of citizenship: deliberation, compromise, consensus
building, and reason giving. 227 Yet it does not explain why we could
not look to state and national governments as affording an
opportunity for fostering such competence and deliberation.
Furthermore, although revivalists claim not to repudiate the gains
made by the women's movement or the civil rights movement, the
devaluation of national government or (for that matter, national
initiatives appealing to rights or to social justice) is troubling for what
it may portend about the role of rights in "democratic civil society."
Remarkably, it appears that the report's only prescriptions involving
the national government involve federal tax incentives to strengthen
two-parent, married families and religious institutions and to return
responsibilities from the national government to local government
and to the institutions of civil society (such as charitable
organizations).229 What is more, A Call to Civil Society refers
repeatedly to the idea of the common good, but it does so only in
connection with the institutions of civil society, and it seems never to
refer explicitly to the idea of the common good of the national polity.
223. A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 10.
224. Id. at 11.
225. A CALLTO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 4.
226. Id. at 10.
227. Id.
228. For the idea of "democratic civil society," see generally A CALL TO CIL SOCIETY,
supra note 11; ELSHTAIN, supra note 2, at 5.
229. See, e.g., A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 11 at 19, 21-23.
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At the root of this strong preference for local government
appears to be the old, face-to-face model of civic engagement, yet it

seems to be at the expense of a conception of national citizenship or,
for that matter, national community. Indeed, although A Call to Civil

Society quests for a shared public moral philosophy, it evidently does
not quest for a meaningful conception of national citizenship or
national community. Or if it does, it does not say so. And some
revivalists contend openly that the idea of "national community" is3°
bankrupt and may be "this century's greatest disappointment."
Such views echo other critiques of liberal appeals to national

community as failing to inspire citizens' loyalty or to capture their
longings for meaningful community.231
The aspiration that civil society supplant government, or that
government wither away, belies the civil society-revivalists' claims
that civil society is a school for citizenship and democratic selfBut
They invoke Tocqueville for such claims.
government.
Tocqueville himself also observed that it was politics that spreads

"'the general habit and taste for association"' and thus that "politics
precedes civil society. ''1 3 2 As suggested above, it is not clear why or
how the institutions of civil society could serve as such a school. For

example, it is not clear why getting people to be members of groups
and associations, and to care about and pursue the good of those

groups and associations, would get them to care about and pursue the
common good of the polity. Doing so may merely get them to care
about and pursue the good of those groups and associations. Worse
still, it may simply spawn forms of groupism and localism that are
antithetical to the common good of the polity as a whole.
In the concluding remarks of the great work Politics and Vision,
Sheldon Wolin writes that "it is not the animus against politics and
the political that is characteristic of our time.., but rather the
sublimation of the political into forms of association which earlier
230. Wiliam A. Schambra, All Community Is Local: The Key to America's Civic Renewal, in
COMMUNITY WORKS, supra note 2, at 44, 46. Schambra was not a signatory to either A Call to
Civil Society or A Nation of Spectators, but he was on an advisory panel for the National
Commission on Civic Renewal, see A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 66, and he
contributed a paper expressing such views to a book prepared for the Commission. See William
A. Schambra, Is There Civic Life Beyond the Great National Community?, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIc RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 89 (contending that the progressive
liberal ideal of a national community has failed).
231. See SANDEL, supra note 116, at 282-304.
232. Kumar, supra note 1, at 391 (paraphrasing Tocqueville); see also Keith E. Whittington,
Revisiting Tocqueville's America: Society, Politics, and Association in the Nineteenth Century, 42
AM. BEHAV. Sc. 21 (1998).
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thought had believed to be non-political."I 3 He observes that "the
vision of political theory has been a disintegrating one, consistently
working to destroy the idea that society ought properly to be
considered as a whole and that its general life was best expressed
through political forms." Wolin argues, moreover, that "the divorce
between what is political and what is general has repeatedly led
recent writers into paths of futility... [such as "localism" and
"groupism"]; the result has been a series of dead ends."' 235 The civil
society-revivalists, especially the moral revivalists, should heed this
caution: they should avoid such disintegrating visions and dead ends.
Put another way, we should resist taking a "flight from the
political," and the related idea that it is possible to choose civil society
236
alone, and thereby escape from the power and coercion of the state.
Instead, as Michael Walzer argues, "the state.., is unlike all the
other associations. It both frames civil society and occupies space
within it. It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all
associational activity (including political activity)."237

Of course, old-fashioned liberal pluralists celebrated private
associations of civil society as "buffers" between the individual and
the state. Yet their celebration of such associations led to a vision of
interest-group pluralism, wherein there was no such thing as the
common good above and beyond the outcome of the clash and
aggregation of private interests in the political marketplace. 238 Such a
theory was corrosive of the idea of civic virtue as an attitude of
concern for the common good and a capacity to deliberate about the
common good. In response, some liberals called for what we today
would call syntheses of liberalism and republicanism. 239 Hence, it is
no surprise that many of the serious proponents of liberal-republican
theories of deliberative democracy such as Amy Gutmann and
Dennis Thompson as well as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman,
who are deeply critical of interest-group pluralism, are not among the
233.

SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN

WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 429 (1960).
234. Id. at 430.

235. Id. at 432.
236. Hefner, supra note 74, at 16; see also Michael Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society,
DISSENT, Spring 1991, at 293, 301.
237. Walzer, supra note 236, at 302.
238. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); DAVID B.
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enthusiastic civil society-revivalists.2 40 Indeed, from the standpoint of
such theories, there are good reasons to be wary of civil society, e.g.,
because of its potential for oppression and because it may undermine
the quest for civic virtue of national citizens. Sandel makes a nod in
the direction of calling for reviving civil society,241 but it is conclusory
and evocative, and he is generally concerned with differentiating
himself, as a civic republican, from communitarians of the sort who
2
yearn to revive civil society.
We venture to suggest that one is most likely to see civil society
as a school for citizenship against a background assumption that
persons otherwise are atomistic individuals, unencumbered selves, or
lone rights-bearers.
Only thus could the barest indication of
connection with others seem to support or even to relate to
citizenship. Only thus could involvement in pursuing the good of a
group appear to reinforce or be conducive to democratic selfgovernment. As suggested above, getting people connected with
others does not necessarily make them good citizens, nor does getting
them to think about and pursue the good of groups and associations
necessarily translate into thinking about and pursuing the common
good of the polity. Thus, revitalizing civil society would not
necessarily support or contribute to democratic self-government
(again, it might primarily relate to personal self-government and
enrich people's personal lives). That is not to say that it would
necessarily undermine it. But reviving civil society may do as much to
supplant as to support democratic self-government. Indeed, that
seems to be what some civil society-revivalists hope it will do.
III. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have raised some questions for proponents of
reviving civil society as a cure for many of our nation's political, civic,
240. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 115; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1986); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). That is not to
say that proponents of deliberative democracy do not advocate civic renewal. Gutmann and
Thompson, for example, are on the Senior Advisory Council of the National Commission on
Civic Renewal. See A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 66.
241. SANDEL, supranote 116, at 343-49.
242. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998)
(introducing the second edition of this book by differentiating himself, as a civic republican,
from communitarians). Sandel advocates civic renewal and, like Gutmann and Thompson, see
supra note 240, is on the Senior Advisory Council of the National Commission on Civic
Renewal. See A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 10, at 66.
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and moral ills. We largely agree with the revivalists that it would be a
good thing to revive civil society, but we have expressed doubts about
whether its revival can reasonably be expected to accomplish what its
proponents hope for it, e.g., moral renewal, civic renewal, and
strengthening the bonds of citizenship. We have suggested that civil
society is at least as important for securing what we call "deliberative
autonomy"-enabling people to decide how to live their own livesas for promoting "deliberative democracy" -preparing them for
participation in democratic life. Working within the tradition of
political liberalism, and guided by key feminist and civic republican
commitments, we also have sketched our own views concerning the
proper roles and regulation of civil society in our morally pluralistic
constitutional democracy.

